

Yasna 32.7

This verse is discussed in *Part Two: Molten, Glowing Metal*, and this analysis of its translation is offered in support of those discussions. In addition, 'molten metal' is discussed in *Part Six: Yasna 51.9*. So to place ideas in context, some repetition is inevitable, for which I ask your indulgence.

Here we have the term '[glowing metal](#)', (just as Y51.9 speaks of '[molten, flowing metal](#)'). These words have been interpreted by many fine linguists to mean the so-called ordeal through which truth speaking or false speaking was determined by pouring molten metal on a person's chest,¹ and they acknowledge that they have translated words in this verse with a "legalistic" interpretation to support that view. With respect, I disagree with these interpretations.

Zarathushtra was highly intelligent (as even the ancient Greeks agreed). How could anyone with even an ounce of intelligence believe that if a person was telling the truth, he would not be harmed when molten metal was poured on his chest?

We will explore (below) the evidence which leads me to conclude that the above interpretation of '[glowing metal](#)' is (with respect) deeply flawed.

In addition to understanding what this metaphor '[glowing metal](#)' stands for, there are other difficulties in translating this verse, arising from several factors which require making interpretive choices. These factors are:

- ambiguities that are inherent in the Avestan language itself which of necessity require translation choices (which are interpretations);
- the fact that a few Avestan words in this verse have not yet been decoded with certainty which requires making educated guesses (which are interpretations); and
- possible mistakes in transmission over the centuries, especially where in chanting the verse, the form of a word may have been influenced by neighboring (or parallel) words, thereby changing its meaning. Alliteration is a feature of Avestan poetry (and prose!),² so when a given word seems to defy linguistic analysis, or does not seem to fit the (perceived) context, linguists look to see how the form of that word may have been influenced and changed by the sounds of neighboring words or parallel phrases ~ especially since there often are mss. variations in writing a given word. And linguists change the word to what they think the original word may have been (called 'emending' and indicated by an asterisk before the word). This also requires interpretive choices.

So it is understandable that a certain amount of guess work and interpretation has been involved in translating this verse. But when educated guesses and interpretations are necessary, it is not enough to make choices that are linguistically defensible. Such choices also need to be consistent with the context of this verse, the song of which it is a part, and the Gathas as a whole.

At very least, interpretations should not reflect religious paradigms which did not exist in Zarathushtra's time period, and which are inconsistent with his thought.

The translations and comments of our group of linguists are referenced here to avoid repeated citations.³

When you see the foregoing translation uncertainties you may jump to the conclusion that it is absurd to try to translate a verse in which so much remains uncertain. But our universe is full of uncertainties. Do scientists throw up their hands and think there is no point trying to make sense of our universe because there is so much that is not known? Of course not. They are constantly trying to put together the bits and pieces of information that we do know, to try to understand, and expand their knowledge of, our universe. Why? Because of a hunger for knowledge for its own sake.

I think in trying to understand Zarathushtra's thought, we need to take the same approach as scientists do in seeking to unravel the mysteries of the universe. Why? Because (based on what we do know) Zarathushtra's ideas in trying to understand the mysteries of life, existence, are so beautiful, that they generate a hunger (at least, they do in me) to know as much of it, as accurately, as we can. You have to decide for yourself, whether you feel the same way.

So in translating this verse, I have endeavored to ascertain Zarathushtra's intent as objectively and accurately as possible. Each implied word in my translation (shown in round parentheses) has a well established basis in Avestan usage (discussed below). My translation choices are linguistically defensible, are consistent with the micro and macro contexts of his thought, and I have stayed as close to the GAv. text as possible, to give you its flavor.

Here is our verse.

- a. *aēšqm.*⁴ *aēnaṅhqm.* *naēcīt.* *vīdvā.* *aojōi.* *hādrōyā.*
 b. *yā.* *jōyā.* *sānghaitē.* *yāiš.* *srāvī.* *x^vaēnā.* *ayanhā.*
 c. *yaēšqm.* *tū.* *ahurā.* *irix təm.* *mazdā.* *vaēdištō.* *ahī.*•• Y32.7, Geldner 1P p. 116.

My translation.

- a. 'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing one professes none (to be) in the right,'
 b. 'which through life, through glowing metal, he learns (for himself); through which (lessons) he has listened (to the Word of Wisdom);
 c. 'of which (Word), You Lord Wisdom, are the end, the Most-Knowing One.' Y32.7.

Discussion:

Let us set aside, for the moment, the intriguing question of how (and of what) the Lord Wisdom is the 'end' in line c., and start at the beginning ~ line a.

The first question that arises is: What are the 'wrongdoings' [*aēnaṅhqm*] referred to in line a.? Well, in the preceding verses of this Yasna 32 they are identified as ~ evil thinking, deceit, disrespect, hateful actions (Y32.3), abandoning reason (32.4), deceiving mankind out of the good way of life by evil thinking and evil words (Y32.5), the wrongdoings used to attain fame (32.6). As you can see, these are thoughts, words and actions that are intrinsically wrong. And our verse Y32.7 starts out by saying that a **knowing one**, (one who knows the teachings of Wisdom ~ the path of the true order of existence) understands that such conduct is not 'in the right'.

The translators in our group have translated *aēnaṅhqm* as "of sins", "of crimes", "of outrages". The word "sins" carries a lot of baggage from other religious paradigms (and later texts!), which can (and do) include conduct that is not intrinsically wrong, but is forbidden by a religious establishment ~ meanings which do not fit the descriptions of wrongdoings mentioned in the preceding verses of

this song (or even in other Gatha verses!). Nor are these previously mentioned wrongdoings in this song, necessarily "crimes" or "outrages". I therefore think 'of wrongdoings' (which means conduct that is intrinsically wrong) for *aēnaŋhqm* in line a. of our verse is closer to Zarathushtra's intent than the translations "sins", "crimes", "outrages" etc. So in our verse, line a. Zarathushtra rejects the types of intrinsically wrongful conduct (mentioned in the preceding verses of this song), as something that a 'knowing one' professes 'none (to be) in the right,'.

A 'knowing one' is one who knows the teachings of Wisdom ~ the path of the true (good, correct) order of existence (*aša-*),⁵ ~ even though, being mortal, he still may be a mix of qualities that are more good and bad (Y30.3), more beneficial and harmful (Y45.2). The word 'professes' here is used as an expression of what the person believes in, or commits to. And in Avestan, the verb *ah-* 'to be' (in its various forms) often is implied. Linguists call this 'metonymy',⁶ and I think it needs to be implied in line a. 'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing one professes none (to be) in the right,'.

So in essence, line a. says that one who knows the teachings of Wisdom, knows that the previously mentioned wrongdoings are not the right way to think, speak and act.

Let us now look at line b. To do so, we need to consider some linguistic information which forms a lovely part of this verse ~ both in poetic technique, in providing a bit of a puzzle to intrigue us, and in ideas, so please bear with me.

In the Gathas, words that have been previously expressed, often are subsequently implied. Linguists (just to complicate our lives !) call this 'ellipsis'.⁷ In our verse, Y32.7, I think *sāngha-* words in various flavors of meaning (and grammatical forms) are first expressed and then implied (more than once) in line b. Here again are lines a. and b., in which the expressed word in line b. is *sānghaitē* 'he learns (for himself)', and the subsequently implied *sāngha-* words (in different flavors of meaning) are shown in round parentheses and green font, so that you can see them at a glance.

Line a. 'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing one professes none (to be) in the right,'

Line b. 'which through life, through glowing metal, he learns (for himself) [*sānghaitē*]; through which (lessons [*sāngha-*]) he has listened (to the Word [*sāngha-*] of Wisdom)...

Now, at first glance, you may think that the meanings of the implied *sāngha-* words (in green font) are not at all the same as the meaning of the expressed *sāngha-* word. But that is not so. Insler 1975 demonstrates that *sāngha-* words (derived from the root *sanh-*) are used in different flavors of meaning among which are 'to declare', 'to teach' (verb); and 'teaching', 'word' (noun). And a moment's reflection makes it clear that these meanings reflect an underlying sense, because when you teach, you declare knowledge or ideas, and 'word' can also mean what is taught (or declared). I am indebted to Insler 1975 for the following examples of these flavors of meaning for *sāngha-* words, which he gives in his commentary under a different verse (Y31.1, pp. 180 - 181, all quotations are from this commentary).

As a verb, 'to teach':

"...I shall teach [*sānghānī*] to you in verse ..." Y46.17,

"...we do teach [*sānghāmahī*] those words [*vacā*]..." Y31.1.

As a noun 'teaching(s)':

"... according to the precepts [*mādrāiš*] of Thy teaching [*sānghahyā* gen. sg.]," Y44.14c.,

"... the understanding of Thy teaching [*sānghahyā* gen. sg.]," Y48.12,

"... the opponents of Thy teaching [*sānghahyā* gen. sg.]," Y48.12,

"... the intentions [*x ratavō* 'reasonings'] of the saviors [*saošyantqm*] are in harmony with Thy mature teachings [*sānghāiš* instr. pl.]," Y46.3. (I translate the *x ratu-* word *x ratavō* as 'reasoning').⁸

As 'word'. In his commentary, Insler gives just the GAv. words for the following examples, so here I give you the English words from his 1975 translation.

"... (since Thou didst create) both actions and words [*šyaoθanācā sānghqscā* acc. pl.]," Y31.11.⁹

"... by their actions and their words [*x'āiš šyaoθanāišcā sānghāišcā* instr. pl.]," Y51.14.¹⁰

Let us now apply the above information to our verse (Y32.7), and see if you agree with my reasoning. Here again (for your convenient reference) is line b.

Line b. 'which through life, through glowing metal, he learns (for himself) [*sānghaitē*]; through which (lessons [*sāṅgha-*]) he has listened (to the Word [*sāṅgha-*] of Wisdom)...'

In line b. we have the expressed word *sānghaitē*, which Skjaervo 2006 tells us is a 3p sg. ('present' tense) verb form in "middle voice". Elsewhere,¹¹ (using the verb 'to do'), he gives an example of one of the ways in which the Av. 'middle voice' translates into English, ~ "he does for himself". In the context of our verse in line b., I think the meaning 'teach' is the most applicable for 3p *sānghaitē*, which in middle voice would give us 'he teaches himself'. Zarathushtra's choice of the 'middle voice' *sānghaitē* 'he teaches himself', is a significant one because in his thought, the lessons we learn through the soul refining process, we have to learn for ourselves ~ teach ourselves ~ through our various life experiences ~ earned (the law of consequences), unearned, and mutual, loving, help.¹²

Another way of saying 'he teaches himself' is to say 'he learns', which is my translation choice. Now you might object and ask: Why not just use 'he teaches himself' for *sānghaitē*? Why 'he learns'? Well in the context of line b., if we use 'he teaches himself', we would get 'which through life he teaches himself through glowing metal', giving the possible meaning that the person uses glowing metal to teach himself. That is not an accurate description of the way in which the soul refining process works as described in the Gathas,¹³ (for which 'glowing metal' is a metaphor, discussed below). But if we use the English equivalent, 'he learns', that obviates the problem. Therefore in this context for *sānghaitē* I think the most accurate English equivalent in meaning is 'he learns'. And to capture Zarathushtra's idea in using the middle voice ~ that we must learn such lessons for ourselves ~ I have add the middle voice words (for himself). The result is linguistically defensible, and also accurately reflects the soul refining process that we see in the Gathas.

So *sānghaitē* 'he learns (for himself)' is the expressed *sāṅgha-* word, which generates the subsequently implied *sāṅgha-* words (shown in green font).

Line b., 'which through life, through glowing metal, he learns (for himself) [*sānghaitē*]; through which (learnings/lessons [*sāṅgha-*] pl.) he has listened (to the Word [*sāṅgha-*] of Wisdom). Here, the implied "(Word" [*sāṅgha-*]" is used in the sense of Wisdom's teachings (there are no capital letters in Av. script).

Why do I think *sāṅgha-* words (after *sānghaitē*) are subsequently implied in line b.? For the following reasons: The first implied word ('lessons') is needed to identify what the pl. pronoun 'through which [*tāiš*]' stands for. I think it stands for the 'teachings/lessons [*sāṅgha-*]' which are learned through life experiences. The second implied word belong with the verb *srāvī* 'he has

listened', and indicates what has been listened to ~ 'the Word, the teaching [*sāngha-*]', of Wisdom. And here with *srāvī* we have a double meaning that needs to be kept in mind. In GAv. (as in English!), to listen to something (or someone) means both to hear and to implement what is heard.¹⁴ The Word, the teachings of Wisdom is the path of truth. A path involves both hearing and implementing. And Word is also implied in line c., 'of which (Word *sāngha-* a collective plural ~ the teachings of Wisdom). In my translation of this verse in *Part Two: Molten, Glowing Metal*, I selected implied word in line c. '(lessons)'. Which fits. But on reflection, I think the implied '(Word)' is a better fit.

Applying these flavors of meaning for *sāngha-* words, ~ first expressed, and then implied, here are lines a. b. and c.

Line a. 'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing one professes none (to be) in the right,'

Line b. 'which, through life, through glowing metal,¹⁵ he learns (for himself) [*sānghaitē*]; through which (lessons *sāngha-*) he has listened (to the Word *sāngha-* of Wisdom);

Line c. 'of which (Word *sāngha-*), You, Lord Wisdom, are the end, the Most-Knowing One.'

Let us now consider the enigmatical line c. It presents a bit of a puzzle. In what sense could the Lord Wisdom possibly be the 'end'? How can the Word of Wisdom ~ the path of truth ~ include the soul refining process of a mortal 'knowing one', and be the 'end' that is the Divine ~ one who has acquired lordship over wisdom¹⁶ '... Lord Wisdom ... the Most-Knowing One'?

Well, the answer lies in certain aspects of Zarathushtra's thought, one of which is his notion of means and ends. His 'means' is the path of truth ~ an incremental attainment of the true (good, correct) order of existence (*aša-*) ~ a path that leads to the 'end' which is the complete attainment of the true order of existence (*aša-*), which is the existence of the Divine ~ an idea that he expresses throughout the Gathas in kaleidoscopic ways.¹⁷ If you think of 'existence' as a continuum, the perfected end of the continuum is the Divine. The unperfected phases of the continuum are the rest of existence ~ progressing towards personified wisdom (the perfected end), through life experiences.¹⁸ So in Zarathushtra's thought, the Divine is indeed his notion of the perfected 'end'.¹⁹

Zarathushtra often engages in word plays, and in other Gatha verses he uses the term 'knowing one' for both mortals (imperfectly enlightened) and the Divine (completely enlightened). Examples are footnoted, in one of which he uses *vīdvah-* 'knowing one' for the Divine and man in the same phrase, *vīdvā vīdušē mraotū* ... "Let the Knowing One [*vīdvā*] speak [*mraotū*] to the knowing [*vīdušē* 'to (the) knowing one'] ..." Y31.17b, Insler 1975.²⁰

In our verse (Y32.7), Zarathushtra, uses 'knowing one' [*vīdvah-*] in line a. for a mortal, and in line c., he uses the superlative 'Most Knowing One' [*vaēdišta-*] for the Divine, ~ suggesting through this play on words, his notion of what the 'end' will be for mortal 'knowing ones', who have gone through the soul refining process. The superlative suffix *-išta-* is used as a crescendo of expression, or heightened quality. Here, in using the 'knowing one' (line a.), and the 'Most Knowing One' (line c.), I think he had in mind, not a difference in kind, but a crescendo of quality, expressing a progression towards complete enlightenment ~ the perfected end of the continuum of existence.

In our verse (Y32.7), lines a. and b. are about the path ~ about knowing what is right and wrong, true and false, which we teach ourselves to understand and implement through the soul refining

process (**glowing metal**), thereby incrementally changing our way of being, from a mix of preferences that are good and bad, mistaken and wise, to those that are wholly good, wholly wise.

This conclusion is corroborated in our verse (Y32.7) by the fact that the GAv. word Zarathushtra has chosen for the **'end [irix tām]** parallels a Ved. word which has flavors of meaning which are helpful in understanding his intent. The Ved. meaning is **'what remains', 'what is left'**. Zarathushtra teaches that we are a mix of divine qualities and their opposites. So when, through the soul refining process of life's experiences, all the opposite, bad, harmful, qualities are eliminated, **'what remains, what is left'** are the good qualities, ~ the wholly good, true order of existence and its components (amesha spenta) ~ an enlightened, **'Most Knowing'** state of being.

This conclusion is corroborated in Y51.9, the verse in which **'molten metal'** is used as a metaphor, which speaks of untruthfulness being destroyed, **'The satisfaction which you give, O Wisdom, for both types (of conduct), through your bright fire, through molten metal [ayaṅhā x šustā], (is) to be given for clarification among living beings, (is to be given for) untruthfulness to be destroyed'. (In this way) You save truthfulness.'** Y51.9, my translation.

In the Gathas, in 1,001 beautiful, kaleidoscopic ways, Zarathushtra tells us that the path and the reward for that path (the means and the end), are the same ~ truth, its good comprehension, its beneficial embodiment, its good rule, a beneficial way of being (amesha spenta) ~ incremental in the means (the path); complete in the **end** (its reward).²¹

You may object, that it is one thing for the continuum to have an **'end'** that is the qualities of the Divine. It is another thing entirely for the **'end'** to be the Divine in being, the Lord Wisdom. True, no place in the Gathas does Zarathushtra explicitly say that Wisdom and other living things are part of one being. But he does indeed infer that very conclusion in 1,001 lovely ways. These have been discussed throughout the chapters of this book, a few of which I footnote here for your convenient reference.²²

You may question: Why did Zarathushtra select the metaphor **'glowing metal'**? Well, the process of using fire to refine metal ore into metal is a metaphor for the soul refining process. The reasons for his use of this metaphor have been discussed in other chapters.²³ Here I will simply offer a reason that particularly applies to this verse (especially line c.). **'Glowing metal'** has a fiery, light filled appearance.²⁴ Fire (the only form of light that man could make in those days) is a metaphor for truth and its components ~ its good comprehension, its beneficial embodiment, its good rule, a beneficial way of being. Thus, the refiner's fire is metaphor for a process of obtaining light (enlightenment) ~ the perfected **'end'** of the continuum of existence.

Now, read the whole verse again, factoring into it the foregoing ideas and see what you think.

- a. **'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing one professes none (to be) in the right,'**
- b. **'which through life, through glowing metal, he learns (for himself), through which (lessons) he has listened (to the Word of Wisdom);**
- c. **'of which (Word), You, Lord Wisdom, are the end, the Most-Knowing One.'** Y32.7, my translation.

Is my translation an interpretation? Surely. But it is an interpretation that does the following:

- ~ it is linguistically defensible,
- ~ it fits the grammatical value of each word,

- ~ it does not leave out any GAv. word (which most of the linguists in our group do ~ demonstrated in the linguistic section below),
- ~ it adds implied words only in accordance with well established Avestan linguistic usage,
- ~ it fits the micro/macro contexts of this verse, the song in which it appears, and the Gathas as a whole ~ expressing ideas Zarathushtra has repeated in many different ways, and,
- ~ equally validating, it is so typical of Zarathushtra's poetic signature ~ his cryptic, multi-dimensional poetic technique.

Before we get into the linguistic discussion (in which you may, or may not, be interested), I would like you to consider ~ conceptually ~ the interpretations of the linguists in our group, (many of which tend to be biblical) ~ heavy on sins and fiery punishment. But in Zoroastrian texts fire is never an instrument of punishment, not even in those Pahlavi texts which describe a grisly 'hell'. Fire is used only as a metaphor for, and symbol of, an enlightenment existence ~ the true order of existence, its comprehension, its embodiment, its rule, the beneficial way of being.²⁵ The translations of our linguists also differ widely in their translation/interpretation of various words. Indeed, if you compare these translations you would be hard pressed to understand how they all could be translations of the same verse.

Insler, Humbach and Faiss interpret '[glowing metal](#)' in this verse as a reference to the mythical ordeal through which guilt or innocence was determined by pouring molten metal on a person's chest ~ a test of truth mentioned in the Shahnamah (and every bit as ridiculous (or 'loaded') as determining if a woman were a witch in the Middle Ages, by making her walk barefoot over hot, burning coals ~ which would burn her feet only if she was truly a witch).

But there is no word 'ordeal' or 'test' in our verse, and some of our linguists themselves acknowledge that they interpret many words in this verse in a "legalistic" way ~ in support of their interpretation of '[glowing metal](#)' as a test of guilt or innocence, and subsequent punishment ~ sincerely believing that their interpretations are correct.

The earlier generation of linguists in our group, also think that '[glowing metal](#)' represents an 'ordeal' idea but a different 'ordeal' ~ the one mentioned in the Pahlavi *Bundahishn* in which, at the end of times, all souls pass through molten metal which purifies them so that they emerge all good. This view is closer to Zarathushtra's intent in that it regards molten metal as a purifying process, but the *Bundahishn* account differs from Zarathushtra's view in which the soul refining process is not a one-shot, end of times event, but an on-going process of spiritual evolution through life experiences.²⁶ Let us now look now at the translations of the linguists in our group to check out their interpretations.

Insler 1975: "[By reason of his correct conduct, a knowing person is never accused of those sins which are decreed to be capital, for which one has \(already\) been tried by molten iron, and of which Thou, Wise Lord, art the One who dost best know the consequences \[ft. 5\].](#)" Y32.7. His ft. 5 says "That is, the punishment to be wrought at the final judgment." (p. 47).

The sense of Insler's translation is that a knowing person is never accused of sins for which the punishment is death (capital punishment), ~ sins for which an unspecified person has already "[been tried by molten iron](#)", ending with an ambiguous [and of which Thou, Wise Lord, art the One who dost best know the consequences](#)", which "consequence" Insler equates (in his commentary) with a "[sentence](#)" (as in being sentenced after a verdict of guilt). But which his footnote 5 interprets to be

punishment at the final judgment (An 'end of life judgment' ? An end of times judgment ? He does not say). In his comments on this verse, Insler does not explain his interpretation of "molten iron". But in a ft. to "(molten) iron" in an earlier verse (Y30.7), he explains that it is "The test of truth during the final judgment". p. 35.

I have a lot of respect for Insler. But I have (a lot of) problems with his interpretations.

In the first part: Even wise, good, innocent, people can be, and are, accused of wrongdoing ~ regardless of their "correct conduct" or however "knowing" they may be. Zarathushtra himself was slandered and accused by the priestly establishment which wanted to discredit and get rid of him, as the Gathas make clear. So it would not be consistent ~ neither with reality, nor with Zarathushtra's own experience ~ for him to say "By reason of his correct conduct, a knowing person is never accused of those sins which are decreed to be capital".

If the intent of Insler's interpretation is that the accuser, judge, and punisher is Wisdom the Lord, then such an idea is not found in the Gathas, and in fact contradicts ideas that are in the Gathas.

The idea of determining guilt or innocence by a physical ordeal of any kind ("...sins ... for which one has (already) been tried by molten iron..."), is contrary to the thought of the Gathas, which specifically states that in making His judgments, the Lord Wisdom is solicitous, caring, and that His judgement is informed by truth (*aša-*), "...Him who offers solicitude (to us), the Wise Lord who, together with His clever advisor, truth, has judged the just [*dāθəmcā* '(what is) just'] and the unjust [*adāθəmcā* '(what is) unjust']."²⁷ Y46.17, Insler 1975. Here, the 'clever advisor, truth' is a poetic way of saying that Wisdom's judgment is informed by truth.

Wisdom does not need an 'ordeal' or 'test' to reveal the truth of a situation. With His (true) judgment He can ascertain the truth for Himself.

And there are other Gatha verses which describe what takes place at the metaphoric bridge "...His soul shall vex him at the Bridge of [*cinvatō* 'discerning'],²⁸ surely, in that he has disappeared from the path of truth by reason of his own actions and (the words) of his tongue." Y51.13, Insler 1975. There is no mention in any Zoroastrian text (of which I am aware) of any physical ordeal as a test of wrongdoing to determine whether or not the soul can make the transition (cross the bridge) to a non-mortal existence ~ not in the Gathas, not in later Avestan texts, not in a much later Pazand text which has a detailed story about what happens at this Bridge, and not even in the Arda Viraf Namah which describes a punitive 'hell' of torments (not found in any Avestan text).²⁹

The idea of Wisdom punishing "sins" by "capital" punishment (death ~ whether physical or spiritual) is also alien to the thought of the Gathas (and later Av. texts). The YAv. Yasht to Mithra ~ a pre-Zarathushtrian deity,³⁰ ~ states repeatedly that telling lies to Mithra and failing to please him, will result in many horrific ways of being killed ~ personally by Mithra himself. But the Lord (who is) Wisdom is not portrayed as a deity who punishes by killing ~ not even in any later Avestan text after the syncretization.³¹

Zarathushtra frequently describes the cruelty, violence, oppression, tyranny, killings, that were causing so much suffering in his society. Yet he does not mention (in any Gatha verse translated by linguists without dispute) any type of conduct which is punished by physical or spiritual death ~ neither delivered by Wisdom, nor by Zarathushtra as the representative of Wisdom, (although

Zarathushtra may well have wished that some of his cruel and violent contemporaries might depart this life).

The Gathas are silent on the subject of capital punishment in secular government. But they are eloquent in stating how evil is defeated in his spiritual philosophy, ~ not by death, but by life, by living experiences, earned and unearned, by mutual loving help, all of which change minds, change preferences, by increasing understanding, making us wiser, more good.³²

Insler acknowledges in his commentary, that he gives a "legalistic" meaning to (what he says are) the usual meanings of some words, as the following list shows (the words in parentheses being Insler's opinion of their usual meanings ~ discussed in more detail in the linguistic analysis below).

He interprets *aojōi* (*aog* "assert") as "accuse", [as in accusing someone of a crime].

He interprets *srāvī* ("was heard") as "was tried" [as in being tried in a criminal proceeding].

He interprets *sānghaitē* ("declare", "teach", "word", "decree") as a legal judgment [of guilt].

He interprets *irix tām* (from *rix ta-* "what remains") as "consequence, sentence" (as in the sentence for a crime).

He emends *jōyā* to **jūyā* from a conjectured original **jīvyā-* "concerning one's life" (with which I agree) which he interprets as "capital" (as in capital punishment ~ in this verse referring to "sins" for which the punishment is death).

Humbach/Faiss 2010: "I explicitly declare to be not conscious of any such outrages which are called irremissible for/of which one becomes notorious (by the ordeal) with glowing metal (and) of which you know the outcome best, O Wise Lord." Y32.7.

They also interpret this verse in a "legalistic" sense, probably because they also interpret *x'aēnā ayañhā* as "(by ordeal) with glowing metal" ~ a test which (they think) reveals guilt of "outrages". Humbach in his earlier 1959 German translation, also interpreted this verse in a "legalistic" sense (which Insler acknowledges in his own 1975 comment).

In his 1991 commentary Humbach thought that *jōyā* should be emended to **jīyā* 'by violence', the instr. sg. of *jyā* 'violence, force, suppression'. But by 2010 he had changed his mind (for which I admire him ~ it takes courage and integrity to do so ~ even though I don't agree with him). Humbach/Faiss 2010 comment that *jōyā* is a mistaken form and should be reconstructed as **a-joya-* meaning "imperishable" in the sense of "irremissible/unforgivable". But the idea of 'unforgivable sin' is alien to both the Gathas and the later texts, as the following establishes.

The idea of 'unforgivable sin' is contrary to Zarathushtra's paradigm for the defeat of evil, which is that everyone will eventually make it to the true order of existence.³³ This Gatha idea is echoed, undisputed, in the universal renovation that is *frašō.kərəiti-* in the YAv. texts,³⁴ and its equivalent in Pahlavi texts *frashgard/frashkart*.³⁵ So the idea of 'unforgivable sin' is contrary, not only to the Gathas, but also to all later Zoroastrian texts. The Pahlavi *Bundahishn* clearly states that in the end everyone will become all good after passing through molten metal an idea which echoes (imperfectly) the Gatha verses which use "molten/glowing metal" as a metaphor for the soul refining process.³⁶ And even in the (horrible) Pahlavi text *Arda Viraf Namah*, no 'sin' is described as 'unforgivable' and hell is temporary.³⁷

So the interpretive choices of Humbach/Faiss in our verse (Y32.7) are contrary to both the Gathas and all later texts (of which I am aware).

Taraporewala 1951: "Among these sinners they-understand not-anything about-progress through effort, such-as is-taught by Life just-like they-say, through the Fiery-Test; Thou, O Ahura, of such best-knowest the end, O Mazda." Y32.7.

In his free translation, he uses the "test of molten brass" (instead of "Fiery-Test"). Taraporewala's translation and comments are a bit puzzling and (with respect) inconsistent. He comments (acknowledging Jackson),

"The idea is probably that of the purification of sinners by passing (figuratively) through 'a river of molten metal'. This idea is repeated in Y51.9 ... Life itself is for us the fiery test of 'molten metal'."

Thus, on the one hand, Taraporewala sees 'glowing/molten metal' as a metaphor for the soul refining process (in which I think he is on the right track), but at the same time he translates the words 'through glowing metal [*x^aēnā ayanhā*]' in our verse (Y32.7) as "the Fiery-Test" in his literal translation, and as the "test of molten brass" in his free translation ~ which terms describe the (mythological) test to determine if a person is telling the truth by pouring molten metal on his chest. The idea of a 'test' is not the same as a metal refining (soul refining) process. A 'test' is not a purifying agent. The two paradigms are entirely different ~ factually and conceptually.

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae: "None of these sins will the understanding commit, in eagerness to attain the blessing that shall be proclaimed, we know, through the glowing metal ~ sins the issue of which O Ahura Mazda, Thou knowest best." Y32.7.

Moulton footnotes "glowing metal" by referencing another discussion of his in which Moulton thinks it represents:

"the flood of molten metal which is to be poured forth at the last. The righteous ~ so the later apocalyptists put it ~ would pass through the flood as through warm milk, but Ahriman and all who were 'of his portion' would be consumed."³⁸

Therefore Bartholomae and Moulton see "glowing metal" as a purifying agent that is destructive of evil, not as a test to determine guilt or innocence, and they equate its result with a "blessing" ~ all of which is closer to Zarathushtra's thought. But Moulton (whom I greatly admire) goes on to express an opinion that is contrary to his own translation of our verse ~ namely that Zarathushtra did not contemplate the annihilation of evil and evil beings because Zarathushtra believed in a permanent hell ~ a conclusion which reflects Moulton's own religious mind-set, which so blinds him that (in my view) he completely misses Zarathushtra's thought.³⁹ In addition, (with respect) Moulton's perception of what the *Bundahishn* says, is incorrect. The *Bundahishn* does not state that the molten metal will annihilate evil 'beings'. It states that all the evil *within* each being will be annihilated, which is consistent with the thought of the Gathas, although expressed as an end of times event rather than a soul refining process during life (which is the way in which Zarathushtra uses the metaphor of 'glowing/molten metal'). This is what the *Bundahishn* says,

"Then all men will pass into that melted metal and will become pure; when one is righteous, then it seems to him just as though he walks continually in warm milk; *but* when wicked, then it seems to him in such manner as though, in the world, he walks continually in melted metal." *Bundahishn*, Ch. 30, § 20, E. W. West translation.

"Afterwards, with the greatest affection, all men come together, ... All men become of one voice and administer loud praise to Auharmazd and the archangels. ..." *Bundahishn*, Ch. 30, §§ 21, 23, E. W. West translation.⁴⁰

In the chapter *Part Two: Molten, Glowing Metal*, I discuss the additional evidence and reasons which supports my conclusions that Zarathushtra uses 'glowing/molten metal' in Y32.7 and Y51.9 (and 'metal' in Y30.7), as a metaphor for the soul refining process. So I will not repeat that reasoning and evidence here.

* * * * *

Let us now look at the linguistics of each word. You may be tempted (more than once!) to throw up your hands and think it is not possible to arrive at a translation of this verse. But do not tear your hair. If you enjoy puzzles, you may be intrigued by the process of untangling the linguistic difficulties, bit by bit, with patience, thought, and good reasoning (*x ratu-*!), to arrive at a translation which is simple, stays close to the GAv. text, is linguistically defensible, and turns out to express ideas we have seen so often in the Gathas.

Line a. *aēšqm aēnañhqm naēcīt vīdvā aojōi hādrōyā*
'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing one professes none (to be) in the right,'

I will discuss the Avestan words, in an order which will enable you to see how the meaning of this line unfolds in English.

aēšqm aēnañhqm 'of these wrongdoings'

aēšqm is the gen. pl. masc./ntr. form of the demonstrative pronoun stem *a-* ('this, that, these, those'), which in Avestan is also used for a 3p personal pronoun ('him, her, it').⁴¹ In this context, a personal 3p pronoun does not fit. So *aēšqm* here is a demonstrative pronoun 'of these'. As gen. pl. ntr. *aēšqm* belongs with gen. pl. ntr. *aēnañhqm*.⁴²

aēnañhqm is gen. pl. ntr. of the stem *aēnah-* (Skjaervo 2006). The word (in its various grammatical values) appears more than once in the Gathas, and has more than one translation option ~ as conduct, and as a person who performs such conduct. The linguists in our group have translated *aēnah-* words in various Gatha verses as persons ('sinners') and as conduct ('sins', 'harm', 'injury', 'crimes', 'outrages', and 'offense').⁴³

In our verse (Y32.7), only Taraporewala translates this word as a person; all others as conduct. Here are the options for *aēšqm aēnañhqm* selected our linguists:

Insler ("of those sins"); Humbach 1991 ("of any (instances of) such crimes"); Humbach/Faiss ("of any such outrages"); Moulton and Bartholomae ("of these sins") ~ all of which translation choices are conduct; whereas Taraporewala has selected persons ("among these sinners").

So how do we decide which English equivalent for *aēnañhqm* in our verse, is the closest to Zarathushtra's intent. Well, in the preceding verses Zarathushtra describes many types of wrongful conduct and also the persons who so act. But in line a. of our verse (Y32.7), he speaks of a **knowing one** who understands what is 'in the right' (conduct) which requires that *aēnañhqm* be what is wrong (conduct). I therefore translate *aēšqm aēnañhqm* as 'of these wrongdoings'.

vīdvā '(a) knowing person',

There are no articles 'the', 'a', 'an' in Avestan. But such articles are required for a fluent English translation, which is why I here show an implied article '(a)' in round parentheses.

vīdvā is a word that demonstrates inherent ambiguities in the Avestan language.

Skjaervo 2006 shows a verb stem *vaēd-* 'to know', from which he derives a perfect participle,⁴⁴ *vīdvah-* "he who knows" (when used as a noun), "knowledgeable" (when used as an adj.), and he shows the form *vīdvā* as nom. sg. masc. of the stem *vīdvah-*.

In our verse (Y32.7) *vīdvā* has been translated variously by the translators in our group, as follows ~ all without comment:

Inslar 1975 "a knowing person" (noun sg.);

Moulton 1912, and Bartholomae "the understanding", (a noun, but unclear regarding whether it is sg. as in 'one who is understanding'; or pl. as in 'those who are understanding');

Humbach 1991 "(to be) ... conscious" (3p verb? noun? adj.?);

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "(to be) ... conscious";

Taraporewala 1951, "they-understand" (3p verb). Taraporewala does not separately comment in this verse on how he construes *vīdvā*. But under Y29.6, where the word also occurs, he comments that *vīdvā* is originally the perfect participle of *vid-* 'to know', that the original meaning is 'knowing', that the form is active, but that in the Vedas, the root is used with the accusative in a "somewhat different sense". In our verse (where he thinks *vīdvā* is used with an acc.) he translates it "they-understand". But in Y29.6 as "enlivening". I am sure the lack is mine, but I do not follow his reasoning to his conclusions based on the evidence.

My take: In the context of our verse, I think 'a knowing one' ~ one who knows (albeit imperfectly) the teachings of Wisdom ~ best fits the context, and reflects similar uses in other verses.

aojōi 'professes'

This verse is the only instance in which *aojōi* is found in surviving GAv. texts. And it is a GAv. word that has not been decoded with certainty. Translators vary in their understanding of its meaning ('assert/accuse', 'declare', 'commit (as in committing an act)', 'progress'), as well as whether it is a noun, or verb in the 1p sg. ('I') or in the 3p sg. ('he').

As a verb.

Skjaervo 2006 conjectures that the stem is *aog-*, in middle voice means 'to declare oneself'; and he thinks *aojōi* is 1p sg. indicative (present) citing this verse Y32.7 as the only instance of its use in GAv. texts ~ which would make it 'I declare myself'. But (just to keep things simple!) in Avestan (Skjaervo cautions), verbs with 'middle' endings, can have 'active', 'passive' or 'middle' meanings. This of course is one of the challenges of translating a word from one language to another ~ sometimes the exact grammatical value in the 2d language does not give the intended meaning in the 1st one. Here are the opinions of the linguists in our group.

Humbach 1991 "I declare myself (to be)...", (1p sg.). His comment is footnoted.⁴⁵

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "I ... declare..." (1p sg.), with no comment on this word.

Inslar 1975: "is ... accused"(3p sg.). He comments that *aojōi* is not 1p sg., but is 3p sg. present of *aog-*. He thinks the normal meaning of the stem *aog-* is 'assert' (which is a flavor of 'declare') but

that in this verse Y32.7, he chooses to give it a 'legalistic' meaning 'accuse', giving a Vedic parallel which he thinks justifies his choice.⁴⁶ (With respect, I do not find the Vedic parallel persuasive). He therefore translates *aojōi* (as 3p sg.) in context as "a knowing person is never accused".

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae translate *aojōi* as a verb 3p present, 'commit' but it is difficult to tell from their translation whether they consider it to be 3p sg. (as does Insler), or 3p pl. "None of these sins will the understanding commit...", and the meaning they ascribe to this verb differs materially (not just as another flavor) from that of the other translators in our group ~ which does not necessarily mean they are incorrect. Ascertaining meaning accurately should not be determined by a head count. But in this context, I do not find their conjectured selection persuasive.

Taraporewala 1951 citing mss. "J3 and four other mss." takes the word to be *aojō*.⁴⁷ He states that Bartholomae's choice (amongst mss. differences) is *aojōi* which Bartholomae takes as an infinitive of *uz-*, *aoz-* (Skt. *ūh-*), 'to perform' (Bartholomae's actual translation 'commit' (as in 'perform') however is not in the infinitive). But Taraporewala states that he himself construes *aojō* as a noun "derived from the same root", stating that the meaning of the root in Skt. is 'to push forward', 'to promote'. He therefore translates the word in this verse as "progress", stating that the context requires it to be acc. sg. ~ the object of *vīdvā* (which he takes to be a verb), and he gives an example from the Rig Veda which he believes is a "derivative from the same root". He translates in context as follows "Among these sinners [*aēnaḥqm*] they-understand [*vīdvā*] not-anything [*naēcīt*] about-progress [*aojō*]..."

But in his comment on *aojī* in Y43.8, he states that the Skt. *ūh-* means 'to declare, to consider', he makes no mention of "progress" and translates *aojī* in Y43.8 as 'I consider myself' (pp. 427, 428).

Although *aojōi* does not appear in any other GAv. text, there are other instances in the Gathas of various grammatical forms of the verb *aog-* which all the translators in our group think is some form of 'to declare, to say, to profess', except Taraporewala ('to consider oneself, 'to denounce').⁴⁸

In light of such uncertainty, how do we translate *aojōi* in our verse (Y32.7)?

Humbly. With an awareness of our fallibility, based on which alternative best fits the context. At least, that is what I have attempted to do.

I take *aojōi* as a verb (3p sg. following Insler) which means 'to profess', as in 'to profess a belief', ~ the belief here being that the types of wrongful conduct mentioned in the immediately preceding verses are not right, correct.

Thus, *aēṣqm aēnaḥqm ... vīdvā aojōi ...* 'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing person professes...'

naēcīt 'none (to be)'

Skjaervo's 2006 shows *naēcīt* as an indefinite pronoun **nom./acc. sg. ntr.**⁴⁹ So too do M&dV 2001 (but in YAv.).⁵⁰ But Beekes 1988 (spelling the word as he thinks it existed originally) shows *naicit* as an indefinite pronoun **acc. sg. ntr.** in GAv.⁵¹

As a ntr. indefinite pronoun *naēcīt* would mean 'none' (referring to conduct or a thing), **not-anything, nothing** (literally **no-thing**).

Insler 1975 "is never [*naēcīt*] accused [*aojōi*]" (not translated as an indefinite pronoun, without comment on *naēcīt*);

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "to be not [*naēcīṭ*] conscious [*vīdvā*]" (not translated as an indefinite pronoun, with no comment on *naēcīṭ*); Humbach 1991 is similar (with no comment on *naēcīṭ*).

Taraporewala 1951 "they-understand [*vīdvā*] not-anything" (indefin. pronoun).

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "None [*naēcīṭ*] of these sins [*aēnaḥqam*]" (indefin. pronoun).

My take: In the context of line a., (in agreement with Bartholomae and Moulton) I take *naēcīṭ* to be 'none' an indefinite pronoun acc. sg. ntr. ~ the object of the verb *aojōi* 'professes'; the ntr. sg. standing for not a single one of the ntr. pl. *aēnaḥqam* 'of wrongdoings' previously mentioned.

Thus *aēṣqm aēnaḥqam naēcīṭ vīdvā aojōi ...* 'Of these wrongdoings [*aēnaḥqam*], a knowing person [*vīdvā*] professes [*aojōi*] none [*naēcīṭ*] (to be) ...'

The verb 'to be' (in various conjugations) often is implied in GAv. Linguists call this 'metonymy'.⁵² I imply it here in its infinitive form '(to be)'.

hādrōyā 'in (the) right'

hādrōyā is a GAv. word which has not yet been decoded with certainty. This verse (Y32.7) is the only instance of any form of this word being used in all surviving GAv. texts (Skjaervo 2006).

Skjaervo 2006 conjectures a stem *hādra-* masc. ntr. but is uncertain regarding its meaning "*honesty(?)". He thinks its form *hādrōyā* is loc. sg. Examples of English translation options for loc. sg. include 'in/on/under/at ___' etc.

Insler, and Humbach see the same Ved. word as cognate, but give *hādrōyā* different grammatical values and somewhat similar (but not identical) flavors of meaning.

Humbach 1991 (like Skjaervo) sees *hādrōyā* as loc. sg. of a conjectured stem *hādra-*. He translates *hādrōyā* as "sincerely" (which is not a loc. translation). He arrives at its meaning based on a Ved. word which he thinks is similar (*sādhú* 'straight, right, well-disposed'). He also thinks that YAv. *hāidišta-* 'straightest, most just' (an epithet of Rashnu) is the superlative degree of *hādra-*, and substantiates his view of the similar meaning of the Ved. word.

Humbach/Faiss 2010 translate *hādrōyā* as "explicitly" commenting that it is either loc. sg. (*hādrōi.ā*) of a noun *hādra-* 'straight' (similar to Ved. Skt. *sādhú*),⁵³ or an adverb of the same type as Ved. *sādhuyā* 'rightly/duly'. But with respect, "explicitly" does not convey any of the flavors they see in the Ved. *sādhú* ~ 'straight, right, well-disposed', nor of the Ved. *sādhuyā* 'rightly/duly'. According to the dictionary, *explicit* means 'stated not merely implied; stated in detail; outspoken; clear; plain; unequivocal'.⁵⁴

Insler 1975 thinks that the form of the word *hādrōyā* is a mistake (whose vocalization was influenced by neighboring words in the course of the recitation of the Gathas) and he thinks that the word is instr. of the stem *hādrāya-* 'correct conduct' which is a compound word consisting of *hādra-* and *āya-* "in a sense that comes very close" to a Ved. parallel (*sādhú*). English translation options for instr. sg. would be 'through/by/with ___', or words of similar import. He emends *hādrōyā* to instr. **hādrāyā* and translates it "by reason of his correct conduct".

Taraporewala 1951 comments that Bartholomae construes *hādrōyā* as a form of a stem *hādra-* deriving from *hād-* (similar to Skt. *sādh-* *sidh-*) 'to accomplish, to succeed'. Taraporewala says, there is first the 'primary derivative' *hādra-* (Ved. Skt. *sidhrā*) 'successful', to which is added the 'secondary'

suffix *-ōyā*, implying 'striving for'. He notes that Bartholomae thinks that it corresponds to Skt. *-aya* or *-īya*. He accepts the derivation given by Bartholomae and the latter's translation 'striving to attain', but in his own translation, Taraporewala translates *hādrōyā* as instr. sg. 'through effort'.

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae translate *hādrōyā* in the loc. sg. as 'in eagerness to attain'.

My take: Following the opinions of Insler and Humbach/Faiss regarding its Ved. cognate and giving it a meaning that is closer to this Ved. cognate than they do, I take *hādrōyā* in this context to be loc. sg. 'in (the) right', thus, *naēcīṭ ... hādrōyā* 'none (to be) in (the) right' referring to the previously mentioned conduct (wrongdoings) ~ none of which are 'right'.

Giving us line a. *aēšqm aēnaḥqm naēcīṭ vīdvā aojōi hādrōyā*

'Of these wrongdoings [*aēšqm aēnaḥqm*], a knowing one [*vīdvā*] professes [*aojōi*] none [*naēcīṭ*] (to be) in the right [*hādrōyā*],'

* * *

Line b. *yā jōyā sēnghaitē yāiš srāvī x^aaēnā ayaḥhā*

'which through life, through glowing metal, he learns (for himself); through which (lessons), he has listened (to the Word of Wisdom),

yā 'which' (nom. pl. ntr.),

Skjaervo 2006 in his Glossary shows numerous verses in which the relative pronoun *yā* appears but does not identify its declension. However, in his 2006 *Old Avestan Lesson 3*, (setting aside du. forms) *yā* is the form for the following declensions of the relative pronoun stem *ya-* meaning 'which, that, who/whom'.

~ nom. sg. fem.

~ nom./acc. pl. ntr.

~ instr. sg. masc./ntr,⁵⁵ ('by/with/through ___').

Insler 1975, Humbach 1991, and Humbach/Faiss 2010 all translate *yā* 'which' as nom. pl. ntr. standing for the ntr. pl. *aēnaḥqm*.

Taraporewala 1951, translates *yā* as 'such as', commenting that he construes *yā* as nom. sg. fem., believing that it stands for *hādrōyā* (which he says is fem. and which he translates as 'through effort').

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae translate *yā* as 'that'; and in their translation it stands for *jōyā* (which they translate as "blessing").

My take: I take *yā* to be nom. pl. ntr. 'which' ~ referring to the pl. ntr. noun 'of wrongdoings' [*aēnaḥqm*].

jōyā (**jūyā*) 'through life'

jōyā is a word that has not yet been decoded with certainty, and linguists differ regarding its form, grammatical value, and meanings. Except for Bartholomae and Moulton, all the linguists in our group think that the word is a mistake, and it has been translated variously as:

Skjaervo 2006 "related to violence(?)",

Insler 1975 "capital", "concerning one's life" (emended to **jūyā*);

Humbach 1991 "called 'by violence'," (emended to **jīyā*);

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "irremissable /unforgivable", (emended to **a-jōyā*);

Taraporewala 1951 "by life" (emended **živyā*), and Bartholomae; followed by Moulton 1912 'gain' or "blessing".

Skjaervo 2006 shows *jōyā* appearing only once ~ in this verse ~ in all surviving GAv. texts. He thinks it is **nom./acc. pl. ntr.** of a stem adj. *jōya-* which he says means "related to violence(?)" the question mark is his and indicates his uncertainty about its meaning.

Humbach 1991 thinks that (through verbal transmission, affected by the preceding *hādrōyā*), the word *jōyā* "seems to be slightly disfigured", and that the word originally was **jiyā*, instr. sg. of the "root-noun" *jiyā-* 'violence, force, suppression' (citing a Ved. parallel). He also believes the word refers to the preceding *aēnanḥam*, and translates the phrase "... crimes which are called 'by violence'..."; i.e. crimes of violence. By 2010 had changed his mind (reflecting his courage and scholarly integrity).

Humbach/Faiss 2010 have opted for a different emendation (change). They comment that *yā jōyā* "whose hemistich has one syllable too few" should be read *yā *ajōyā*. They also explain that the spelling *ōyā* for expected *ayā* or *iyā* may be due to the influence of the preceding *hādrōyā*, and conclude that the re-constructed **a-jōyā* "seems to mean 'imperishable' in the sense of 'irremissable/unforgivable'...".

Insler 1975 also thinks *jōyā* is a mistake, and emends it to what he thinks was the original word **jūyā* which he says is an "orthographic variation" of YAv. *jīvyā-* 'concerning one's life'. He translates **jūyā* as 'capital' (as in 'capital punishment') commenting that it belongs with *aēnanḥam* in the sense of *aēnā *jīvyā* "offenses concerning one's life" (those for which one's life is at stake), citing an Akkadian parallel *dīn napišti* "a case of life" which he says is "used in exactly this sense." Akkadian is an ancient Indo-European language (as is GAv.).

Taraporewala 1951 also thinks *jōyā* is a mistake, commenting as follows. He says that Bartholomae translates *jōyā* as 'gain' or 'blessing', believing the Skt. *jaya* is cognate, whereas Andreas "reads" the word as *živyā*, which, if correct, "may be compared with *ḡvaya*, *jīvyā*, *jūyā*, mentioned by Bartholomae. Taraporewala notes that *ḡvaya* occurs in Yasht 19.11 (Zamyad), where it means 'life, pertaining to life'. (Hintze's translation of *ḡvaya-* in Yt. 19.11 is slightly different 'make alive, revive').⁵⁶ He therefore "takes the hint" from Andreas, and construes this word as instr. sg. 'by life'.

Moulton 1912, who follows Bartholomae translates *jōyā* as "the blessing", which they link with *hādrōyā* 'in eagerness to attain' (their translation of *hādrōyā*).

My take: In this context, following the opinions of Andreas, Taraporewala and Insler (but not Insler's interpretation) I take *jōyā* to be originally instr. sg. **jūyā* 'through life'.

sānghaitē 'he learns (for himself)'

Skjaervo 2006 conjectures the verb stem *sqh-* / *sāngha-* which he says in active voice means 'to announce', and he shows *sānghaitē* as its 'middle voice', 3p sg. Indicative ('present' tense) form. Elsewhere,⁵⁷ (using the verb 'to do') he gives an example of one of the ways in which the middle voice translates into English, ~ 'he does for himself'. This does not mean that every translation that does not include 'himself' as part of the meaning of *sānghaitē* is necessarily wrong, because (as with so many Av. conjugations) the middle voice cannot always be translated into English in one exact or

identical way. But in this instance, I think the inclusion of 'himself' as part of a translation of (3p middle voice) *sānghaitē* works well (as explained in the *Discussion* section above).

Humbach/Faiss 2010 translate *sānghaitē* as "are called", giving it a 3p pl. translation ("... of any such outrages which [yā] are called [*sānghaitē*] irremissible [**ajōyā*] ..."); Humbach 1991 translated the word in the same way "are called", giving it a 3p pl. translation ("... of any .. such crimes which [yā] are called [*sānghaitē*] 'by violence' [**jiyā*]...").

Insler 1975: translates *sānghaitē* as "are decreed" 3p pl., ("... those sins which [yā] are decreed [*sānghaitē*] to be capital [**jūyā*]"). In a detailed comment (under another verse Y31.1 pp. 180 - 181), he expresses the opinion that in the Gathas, the root *sanh-* is employed in 3 senses ~ (1) "declare or announce",⁵⁸ (2) "teach", (discussed above) and (3) in a "technical sense 'decree' (legalistic)". But in addition to our verse (Y32.7), he shows only one other Gatha verse in which he thinks 'decree' is the appropriate translation, "...How shall I bring to life that vision of mine, which the master of a blessed dominion would decree [*sahyāt*] by reason of his lofty rule", Y44.9, Insler 1975.⁵⁹ With respect, I do not think "decree" fits Y44.9 either, because "the master of a blessed dominion" might 'declare' his commitment to Zarathushtra's envisionment, or may even perhaps cause it to be 'taught'. But neither in the Gathas, nor in any Avestan text is there any evidence whatsoever, that a ruler or 'master' was should require his subjects ~ by compulsion (decree) ~ to worship Wisdom. The freedom to choose (which includes choosing one's religious beliefs)⁶⁰ is a fundament of Zarathushtra's thought in the Gathas. Indeed, his paradigm for the defeat of evil cannot not work without the freedom to choose ~ in all aspects of life, religious and secular.⁶¹ And the YAv. texts are proof of a thriving worship of many deities (some of whom were pre-Zarathushtrian Indo-Iranian deities) whose worship was not the envisionment of Ahura Mazda (or Zarathushtra). Many YAv. texts are dedicated to the worship of other deities, whose religions thrived and eventually were syncretized with Zarathushtra's teachings.⁶²

Taraporewala 1951 translates *sānghaitē* as "is taught" giving it a 3p sg. translation ("...about-progress [*aojō*] through effort [*hādrōyā*], ... such as [yā] is taught [*sānghaitē*] by life [**juyā*]...").

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae translate *sānghaitē* as "shall be proclaimed" which is one of the acknowledged meanings of the stem *sah-* 'to declare'. They give it a 3p sg. translation referring to the previously mentioned *jōyā* ("...the blessing [*jōyā*] that [yā] shall be proclaimed [*sānghaitē*]...").

My take: Following Skjaervo 2006, I construe *sānghaitē* as 3p sg. (present) middle voice, but give it the meaning most frequently used in the Gathas, thus literally 'he teaches himself', but its meaning in the context of line b. comes through more accurately as 'he learns (for himself)' (for the reasons already given in the *Discussion* section above. To learn, is the same as to teach oneself, but adding '(for himself)' captures Zarathushtra's intent in using the middle voice for this verb.

Thus I have, *yā *jūyā sānghaitē*

'which [yā] through life [**jūyā*] he learns (for himself) [*sānghaitē*]...!'

yāiš 'through which (lessons *sānghāiš* instr. pl. masc.)

yāiš is the form for only instr. pl. masc./ntr., of the relative pronoun stem *ya-*, according to both Skjaervo and Jackson.⁶³ Here are the ways in which *yāiš* has been translated by each of the linguists in our group:

Insler 1975 and Humbach 1991 "for which" (a **dat. pl.** translation) referring to the previously mentioned **ntr. pl. noun** *aēnaṅhqm* (Insler "of ... sins..."; Humbach "of ... crimes"); but *yāiš* is not the form for **dat. pl.** The **masc./ntr. form** for **dat. pl.** is *yaēibyō* (Skjaervo and Jackson).

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "for/of which" (a **dat./gen. pl.** translation) referring to the previously mentioned *aēnaṅhqm* "of ... outrages..."; but neither Skjaervo nor Jackson 1892 show *yāiš* as **dat. or gen. pl.** (the **gen. pl.** of *ya-* is *yaēšqm*).

Taraporewala 1951 "just-like" (which does not fit any declension of *yāiš* shown by Skjaervo or Jackson);

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae: their translation does not account for *yāiš*.

My take: Following Skjaervo and Jackson, both of whom show *yāiš* as the form only for **instr. pl. masc./ntr.**, I translate *yāiš* as **instr. pl. masc.** 'through which' standing for an implied **instr. pl. masc.** implied noun '(lessons *sānghāiš*)' ~ which a person learns (for himself) through life experiences. Skjaervo 2006 shows the **masc. noun stem** *sāngha-* which he says means 'announcement'. If we take *sqh-* (from the root *sanh-*) to mean 'to declare, to announce', its **masc. noun** *sāngha-* would be 'declaration' or 'announcement' (which does not fit contextually here). But if (based in Insler's commentary) we take *sqh-* (from *sanh-*) to mean 'to teach', its **masc. noun** *sāngha-* would be 'teaching, lesson', which fits here both linguistically and in meaning.

Thus 'through which [*yāiš* **instr. pl. masc.**] (lessons *sānghāiš* **instr. pl. masc.**)

srāvī 'he has listened'

Skjaervo 2006 shows *srāvī* as a verb form, **aor. passive 3p sg.** of the stem *srao-/sru-*, 'to hear, to listen'. Using another verb ('to do'), he gives an example of the **aorist tense** as follows, 'he did, he has done'; and he gives an example of the 'passive' voice as follows, 'it is done', 'he is killed'.⁶⁴ But the linguists in our group give *srāvī* various flavors of meaning.

Insler 1975 "one has (already) been tried" (as in a criminal proceeding) without comment on its grammatical value. He cites no other Gatha verse in which the verb *srao-/sru-* is used in this sense.

Humbach 1991, and Humbach/Faiss 2010 "one becomes notorious", without comment.

Taraporewala 1951 "they-say", commenting that *srāvī* is **3p sg.** of *sru-*; but his translation is **3p pl.** and the acknowledged meaning of *sru-* is 'to hear, to listen'; Taraporewala's "say" is an entirely different meaning.

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "we know", (which is **1p pl.**). I cannot explain their choice ~ neither its grammatical value, nor its meaning.

My take: Following Skjaervo's opinion on *srāvī* as **aor. passive 3 p. sg.** of *srao-/sru-*, 'to hear, to listen', I translate *srāvī* as 'he has listened', to which I add (as the indirect object of this verb) two previously expressed words, which are implied here '(to the Word [*sāngha-*] of Wisdom'.

Thus, *yā *jūyā sānghaitē yāiš srāvī ...*

'which [*yā*] through life [**jūyā*] ... he learns (for himself) [*sānghaitē*]; through which [*yāiš*] (lessons *sāngha-*) he has listened [*srāvī*] (to the Word [*sāngha-* pl.] of Wisdom), ...'

'... to the Word [*sāngha-*] is a collective plural ~ all the teachings of Wisdom.

x'aēnā ayaṅhā 'through glowing metal'

ayaṅhā is instr. sg. of the ntr. noun stem *ayah-* and means some kind of metal (Skjaervo 2006).

x'aēnā is instr. sg. ntr. of the adj. stem *x'aēna-* a word that is used only this once in surviving GAv. texts according to Skjaervo 2006, and this instr. sg. ntr. adj. describes the instr. sg. ntr. noun *ayaṅhā*.

In the linguistic origins of *x'aēna-* we see the related ideas of 'glowing, fiery, sunlike'.⁶⁵

In our verse, *x'aēnā ayaṅhā* has been translated by each of our linguists as follows:

Humbach 1991 as "by the (ordeal of) glowing metal" (instr. sg.)

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "(by the ordeal) with glowing metal" (instr. sg.)

Taraporewala 1951 "through the Fiery-Test" (instr. sg.)

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "through the glowing metal" (instr. sg.)

Insler 1975 "by molten iron" (instr. sg.) without comment. In Y51.9, all agree (including Insler) that 'molten' is *x šustā*, which Skjaervo 2006 shows as deriving from *x šaod-* 'to flow, be liquid'; whereas here, (in our verse Y32.7) the adjective describing metal is *x'aēnā*, not *x šustā*.

My take: In light of the fact that it's companion phrase is 'flowing molten metal' Y51.9, I think in our verse 'through glowing metal' (instr. sg.) best fits the meaning of *x'aēnā ayaṅhā* in the context of this verse and the Gathas. The word order (syntax) in GAv. often is not the same as the word order in English, and here, I think placing 'through glowing metal' after 'through life' makes the English translation less awkward, more clear. Its meaning (in my view) is the metal refining process, used here as a metaphor for the soul refining process (discussed above and in another chapter).⁶⁶

Thus ~ giving each word a linguistically acknowledged grammatical value and meaning, and in accordance with Avestan usage in which a word that is once expressed, is sometimes subsequently implied (ellipsis), I translate the whole line as follows:

Line b. *yā *jūyā sāṅghaitē yāiš srāvī x'aēnā ayaṅhā*

'which [*yā*] through life [**jūyā*], through glowing metal [*x'aēnā ayaṅhā*], he learns (for himself) [*sāṅghaitē*]; through which [*yāiš*] (lessons *sāṅgha-*) he has listened [*srāvī*] (to the Word *sāṅgha* pl. of Wisdom);'.

* * *

Line c. *yaēšqam tū ahurā irix təm mazdā vaēdištō ahī* ••

'of which [*yaēšqam*] (Word pl.) You [*tū*], Lord Wisdom [*ahurā ... mazdā*], are [*ahī*] the end [*irix təm*], the Most-Knowing One [*vaēdištō*].

yaēšqam 'of which'

Skjaervo 2006 and Jackson 1892 both show that *yaēšqam* is only gen. pl. masc./ntr. of the relative pronoun stem *ya-*.⁶⁷ The linguists in our group translate it as follows:

Insler 1975 "of which" (gen. pl. ntr. standing for ntr. pl. *aēnanhqm* 'of sins')

Humbach 1991 "for which" (pl., probably standing for ntr. pl. *aēnanhqm* 'of crimes' and here he gives the gen. *yaēšqam* a dat. flavor in English, which sometimes is required in Avestan).⁶⁸

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "of which" (gen. pl. probably standing for ntr. pl. *aēnanhqm* 'of outrages')

Taraporewala 1951 "of such" (gen. pl. probably standing for ntr. pl. *aēnanhqm* 'of sinners')

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "of which" (gen. pl. standing for ntr. pl. *aēnanhqm*).

My take: *yaēšqm* is the third relative pronoun in this one verse, and in English it would be difficult, based on the context alone, to say which relative pronoun stands for which noun. But in Av. it is a bit easier, because a relative pronoun has to be in the same gender and number as the noun it stands for. We know that the gen. *yaēšqm* 'of which' is pl. and can be used as masc. or ntr. Therefore (unless you give this verse a 'legalistic' (or biblical) interpretation, which, for the many reasons already discussed, is not consistent with the thought of the Gathas and even the later texts), I do not think the context of this verse, and line c. in particular, lends itself to a translation of *yaēšqm* as pl. ntr. standing for pl. ntr. 'wrongdoings' (or 'sins'), or pl. masc. 'wrongdoers' (or 'sinners'). Nor can pl. *yaēšqm* stand for the sg. *xʷaēnā ayaṅhā* 'glowing metal'.

I take the pl. pronoun *yaēšqm* (masc./ntr.) as masc. here, standing for the implied masc. pl. word '(Word *sāngha-*)', which fits the *micro* and *macro* contexts exactly, because 'Word' is a collective plural for the teachings of Wisdom.

Thus, *yaēšqm* 'of which (Word), ...'

tū 'You [sg.]' or 'Thou'

There is no dispute that *tū* is a 2p sg. personal pronoun, one of the forms for nom. sg. which in line c., all linguists in our group agree stands for the Lord, Wisdom. I agree and therefore have capitalized the first letter of the English 'You' (there are no capital letters in Av. script). Normally, when a personal pronoun belongs with a verb (such as 'thou art') the form of the verb itself indicates whether it is 1p, 2p, 3p, and sg. or pl. so the pronoun is not separately stated, (as it is in English) unless the author has a special reason for doing so, such as emphasis, or style. Here *tū* 'You' [sg.] belongs with *ahī* 'are' (sg.), but is separately stated perhaps for just those reasons ~ emphasis and style.

ahurā ... mazdā 'Lord Wisdom,
ahurā and *mazdā* are both voc. sg. of the stems *ahura-* 'lord', and *mazdā-* 'wisdom'.
Thus, *yaēšqm tū ahurā ... mazdā* 'of which You, Lord Wisdom, ...'

ahī '[you sg.] are' or '[thou] art'

ahī is indicative (present tense) 2p sg. of the verb *ah-* 'to be' (Skjaervo 2006). Very often, in Avestan, the verb 'to be' is implied. But here, (as with its pronoun 'thou') I think it is expressed for emphasis and style.

Insler 1975 "Thou ... art the One". The last two words are not in the GAv. text. But Insler's translation would not work without the addition of "the One".

The translations of line c. by all the other linguists in our group ignore *ahī*. Their translations would not work if they had to account for *ahī*.

But if we want to ascertain Zarathushtra's intent, we cannot just ignore GAv. words which do not fit a preferred translation, or add words to make it work, if there is another linguistically sound alternative that is also contextually a good fit.

My take: In Avestan, the verb often is at the end of a sentence or phrase, as it is here in line c. But to accommodate English syntax, I have changed the Av. word order so that you can see how the sense of the line unfolds.

Thus, *yaēšqm tū ahurā ... mazdā ... ahī* 'of which You, Lord Wisdom, are ...'

irix tām '(the) end'

The declension of *irix tām* does not seem to be a problem, because there is agreement that its stem is an *a-* stem word. But in its meaning, *irix tām* is another GAv. word that has not yet been decoded with certainty, although some differences may be just different perspectives of an underlying meaning. Skjaervo 2006 shows our verse (Y32.7) and also Y44.2 as the only two instances of *irix tām* (or any other form of the stem) in surviving GAv. texts.

Skjaervo 2006 conjectures *irix tām* as nom./acc. sg. of *irix ta-*,⁶⁹ which he says is a past participle of the verb stem *raēk-* which he thinks means "to leave", showing a Ved. cognate *rinākti*, and in fact, he shows *irix ta-* and its declension *irix tām* under *raēk-*. He thinks the stem *irix ta-* means "left-over, remnant".

Insler 1975 conjectures that the stem is *rix ta-* meaning "what remains" but says that here he interprets the word to mean "consequence, sentence" (as in the sentence given for a crime). He comments (under our verse Y32.7) that *rix ta-* 'consequence, sentence' "belongs with similarly legalistic use of *raēx ənah-* 'legal inheritor' in Y32.22. And in Y44.2, he translates *irix tām* as "heritage" ~ "watching over the heritage [*irix tām*] for all", (without comment in Y44.2 on *irix tām* as "heritage"). I can see an underlying relationship in meaning between 'what remains' and 'inheritance', because 'what remains' of a person's assets after his life, is his heir's 'inheritance'. But I am not persuaded that those two meanings have an underlying relationship with the meanings 'consequence' or 'sentence' as a punishment. One cannot even argue that a sentence is 'what remains' to be done by a judicial authority after the verdict, because the 'sentence' is not the end. There could be appeals to a higher judicial authority. But even absent an appeal, a sentence is not the end. It has to be carried out.

Humbach 1991 translates *irix tām* as "net asset" both in our verse and in Y44.2. Commenting under our verse Y32.7, that he conjectures the stem is *irix ta-* which is "a nominalized p.p.p. of the root *raēk-/ric* 'to leave'." In English, some flavors of a past participle passive might be '(what) has been left', '(what) remained'.

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "the outcome", without comment.

Taraporewala 1951 "end", commenting that *irix tām* is acc. sg. ntr., and means "end, result, i.e. the consequences of their sins". In his opinion, the word originally meant "ending" or "coming to an end" and is derived from the root *ric- rik-* (Skt. *ric-*) "to leave behind, to relinquish, to make free".

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae, "the issue" (in the sense of 'the result').

My take: I take *irix tām*, as nom. sg. (Skjaervo 2006) ~ a declension which fits taking *irix tām* as the object of "You are".⁷⁰ And of all the flavors of meaning for *irix tām*, the only one that fits in line c. is nom. sg. '(the) end', because the only (undisputed) verb in this line is *ahī* 'you are', and the only person identified in this line is the Lord Wisdom. I therefore take *irix tām* as '(the) end' in the sense of pure goodness, pure wisdom personified, ~ the end result of the soul refining process (glowing metal) mentioned in the preceding line b. And this fits the thought of the Gathas where, in 1,001 ways, the 'end' of taking the path of truth (*aša-* and its components the amesha spenta), is truth itself (*aša-* and its component parts the amesha spenta), which is the existence of Wisdom (discussed

in more detail in the *Discussion* section above).⁷¹ And this meaning '(the) end' also fits well the other Gatha verse, Y44.2, in which *irix tām* is used.⁷²

One other important factor. This translation of line c., in which the Lord Wisdom is '(the) end', is corroborated by the way in which Zarathushtra has chosen to arrange the words *ahurā irix tām mazdā*. In the Gathas, Zarathushtra frequently employs a technique in which two words which belong together (here *ahurā ... mazdā*) frame, or encapsulate, one or more other words (here *irix tām*), when he wants such words to form one unit of thought. This technique was first brought to my attention by Insler's insight, in his essay on the Ahuna Vairya.⁷³ And I have explored it in depth in the Gathas, as discussed in other chapters.⁷⁴ So in line c., the words *ahurā irix tām mazdā* form one unit of thought ~ that the Lord Wisdom is the end (of the soul refining process).

True, in most instances of such framing, all the words are on one side or other of the ceasura (the poetic break in the meter of each line). Here the phrase *ahurā / irix tām mazdā* extends over the ceasura (indicated by the insertion of a diagonal line). But that makes no difference where the two words that belong together (here *ahurā* and *mazdā*) are themselves separated by the ceasura. For example, in Yasna 43, we have the same phrase repeated in 5 verses, in which this framing technique crosses the ceasura in each instance. Here it is. To enable you to see this framing in the GAv. text, I have placed the framed or encapsulated word in red font (*pairī.jasaṭ* 'he attended'), and the two words which belong together and frame *pairī.jasaṭ* in blue font (*vohū* and *manajhō* instr. sg. forms of the stems *vohu-* *manah-*), with *vohū* ~ the first framing word ~ on one side of the ceasura and *manajhō* on the other ~ just as in our verse (Y32.7) *ahurā* ~ the first framing word ~ is on one side of the ceasura and *mazdā* is on the other.

Here is this framing technique in Y43.

hyaṭ mā vohū / pairī.jasaṭ manajhō

"when he attended me with good thinking" Y43.7, 9, 11, 13, 15. Insler 1975. Here the intent of the framing technique is to lock 'he attended' into 'with good thinking' to form one unit of thought.

This framing technique in line c. of our verse ~ a double framing. In the micro framing, the two words that belong together, *ahurā* and *mazdā*, frame *irix tām* 'the end'. In the macro framing, the two words that belong together, *tū ... ahī* 'Thou art', frame all the words in between, including the micro frame-set.

... tū ahurā / irix tām mazdā vaēdištō ahī.

The micro framing joins into one unit of thought 'the end' and the 'Lord Wisdom', *ahurā irix tām mazdā* ~ which is reinforced by the macro framing *tū ... ahī* 'Thou art'. Thus,

Line c. *yaēṣqm tū ahurā irix tām mazdā vaēdištō ahī* 'of which ('Word'), You Lord Wisdom, the Most Knowing One, are the end.'

vaēdištō '(the) Most Knowing One'

Bear with me while I give you some information that you may think is not relevant. It is very relevant. Skjaervo 2006 shows two verb stems: (1) *vaēd-* 'to find' (not applicable here);⁷⁵ and (2) *vaēd-* 'to know', which has generated related nouns and adjectives. Bear in mind, all Avestan stems are conjectured. It is part of the decoding process for a language that for more than 1,000 years was not understood.

From the verb stem *vaēd-* 'to know', Skjaervo 2006 thinks the stem *vīdvah-* means "he who knows" (when used as a noun), and "knowledgeable" (when used as an adj.), and he shows the form *vīdvā* as nom. sg. masc. of the stem *vīdvah-* (*vīdvā* 'the knowing one' which appears in line a. of our verse).

If we want to create a superlative adj., the most frequently used suffix is *-išta*. For example, *vohu-* 'good', *vahišta-* 'most good'; *spānta-* 'beneficial', *spāništa-* 'most beneficial'; *maz-* 'great', *mazišta-* 'most great' etc.). The examples are numerous. Beekes 1988 (who spells words in the way he thinks were their original GAv. forms, rather than how they are written in mss.) shows in a long list of superlatives, the adj. *vid-* "knowing" generating the superlative *vaidišta-*,⁷⁶ which most mss. write as *vaēdištō* in our verse,⁷⁷ which Skjaervo 2006 says is nom. sg. of the stem *vaēdišta-* (Skjaervo 2006).

There can be no dispute that *vaēdištō* is a superlative adj. ultimately deriving from the verb *vaēd-* 'to know'; as such it would mean 'most knowing' (adj.), which in Av. can be used as a noun 'most knowing one'.

Why is all this important?

Because *vaēdištō* is a superlative adj. It is not a verb. Yet all the linguists in our group have translated *vaēdištō* as a verb, 2p sg. indicative (present) referring to Wisdom the Lord ~ 'thou best knowest', or words to that effect. But the 2p sg. indicative of *vaēd-* is *vōistā* (Skjaervo 2006) ~ not *vaēdišta-*. And the fact that the last part of the verb form *vōistā* is *-istā*, (notice, not *-išta*) does not turn that verb into a superlative, as demonstrated in other Gathas verses in which the verb *vōistā* is used. For example, here are the two other Gatha verses in which *vōistā* is used. I give you each of them translated by our group of linguists:

Inslar 1975:

Y32.6 "...(But) Thou knowest [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] only when there is uplifting of beings with the very best [*vahištā*] thinking...";

Y46.10 "...those things which Thou dost know [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] to be the best [*vahištā*] for existence ...".

Humbach 1991:

Y32.6 "...Thou knowest [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] (about that) through best [*vahištā*] thought...";

Y46.10 "...which Thou knowest [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] (to be) the best of existence...".

Humbach/Faiss 2010:

Y32.6 "...you, O Lord, know [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] ... through best [*vahištā*] thought...";

Y46.10 "...the things) which you know [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] to be the best [*vahištā*] of the existence/world...".

Taraporewala 1951:

Y32.6 "...Thou-art-aware [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] ... through-(Thy)-Supreme [*vahištā*] Mind...";

Y46.10 "...what Thou deemest [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] the best [*vahištā*] ...".

Moulton 1991 and Bartholomae:

Y32.6 "...this thou knowest [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] by the Best [*vahištā*] Thought, O Ahura,...";

Y46.10 "...what thou, Mazdah Ahura, knowest [*vōištā* 2p sg. verb] as best [*vahištā*] in life...".

In each of these verses the superlative *best* (or 'most-good'), is not part of the verb *vōištā*. It is a separate superlative adj. *vahištā*.

Yet in line c. our translators have chosen to translate the superlative adj./noun *vaēdištō* 'most-knowing' as a verb form (many of them ignoring the verb *ahī* which actually is in line c.). Indeed, their other translation choices for line c. would not work if they were to give *vaēdištō* its true grammatical value ~ a superlative adj. 'most knowing', or noun 'most knowing one', because that would make *irix tām* unworkable. To be workable with their translation choices, *irix tām* (a nom./acc. sg. noun) would have to be genitive sg. which (in GAv.) would be **irix tahiā*. As you read the following translations, keep in mind that in line c., there are no two separate GAv. words 'know' and 'best'. These two English words have been used by our linguists to translate the one GAv. word *vaēdištō* as a verb and its adverb. Here is line c. in GAv. so that you have a ready reference.

Line c. *yaēšqm tū ahurā irix tām mazdā vaēdištō ahī*

Taraporewala 1951, comments that *vaēdištō* is literally 'the best knower' (noun) and he gives a Ved. cognate that is used in the same way in the Rig Veda, as the epithet of a deity. Yet in our verse, he translates *vaēdištō* as a verb "Thou O Ahura, of such best-knowest [*vaēdištō*] the end [*irix tām*], O Mazda." Notice, the verb *ahī* '(thou) art' is missing from his translation.⁷⁸ If (using his other translation choices) he were to translate *vaēdištō* as a noun, there would be a place for *ahī* 'thou art' but *irix ta-* would have to be gen., giving us "Thou O Ahura, of such art [*ahī*] the best-knower [*vaēdištō*] of the end [**irix tahiā*]⁷⁹ gen. sg., O Mazda." But the word form Zarathushtra has chosen, *irix tām*, is not gen. sg.

Insler 1975, translates *vaēdištō* as a verb. The words in green font are not in the GAv. text. "and of which Thou, Wise Lord, art the One who dost best know [*vaēdištō*] the consequences [*irix tām*]." With Insler's other translation choices, if *vaēdištō* is translated as a noun, *irix tām* would have to be gen. sg. giving us 'of which Thou, ... art ... the best-knower [*vaēdištō*] of the consequences [**irix tahiā* gen. sg.]'.

Humbach 1991, translates *vaēdištō* as a verb, "(and) for which Thou, O Wise Ahura, knowest best [*vaēdištō*] the net assets [*irix tām*]." The verb *ahī* '(thou) art' is missing from his translation. With *vaēdištō* as a noun, there would be a place for *ahī* 'thou art' but with his other translation choices, *irix ta-* would have to be gen., ('...Thou, ... art [*ahī*] the best-knower [*vaēdištō*] of the net assets [**irix tahiā* gen. sg.]). His word *best* is not in the GAv. text. He has used the superlative adj. *vaēdištō* as a verb and its adverb "...Thou ... knowest best [*vaēdištō*]."

Humbach/Faiss 2010: translates *vaēdištō* as a verb. Bear in mind, their two English terms "you know" and "best" are not two separate GAv. words. They have used the one GAv. word *vaēdištō* for both: "(and) of which you know [*vaēdištō*] the outcome [*irix tām*] best [*vaēdištō*], O Wise Lord." Here also the verb *ahī* '(thou) art', is missing. And in line c., there is no GAv. word to account for their English word *best*. They have used the superlative adj. as a verb and its adverb "...you know [*vaēdištō*] the outcome [*irix tām*] best [*vaēdištō*]."

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae: "sins the issue [*irix tām*] of which, O Ahura Mazda, Thou knowest best [*vaēdištō*]." The verb *ahī* '(thou) art', is missing. The word "sins" is in green font because there is no GAv. word for it in line c. They have added it as an interpretive aid to show that in their opinion the relative pronoun *yaēšqm* 'of which' stands for the previously mentioned "sins". And the same arguments apply ~ for their translation to work, and include *ahī* 'thou art', with their other

translation choices, *irix tām* would have to be gen. sg., ('...Thou art [*ahī*] the best-knower [*vaēdištō*] of the issue [**irix tahyā* gen. sg.].').

My take: I prefer to stay as close to the grammatical values and meanings of GAv. words as possible (consistent with fluent English) because doing so reveals more accurately Zarathushtra's intent (instead of the mind-set of the translator). Nor am I comfortable leaving out GAv. words just to make a translation work. And I add implied words not expressed in the GAv. text, only in accordance with normal Avestan usage. I therefore give *vaēdištō* its normal grammatical value ~ a superlative adj. which here is used as a noun, which fits its nom. sg. declension (Skjaervo 2006); I give each GAv. word its English equivalent; and I have added the implied words as already explained.

Thus, *yaēšqm tū ahurā irix tām mazdā vaēdištō ahī*

'of which [*yaēšqm*] (Word) You [*tū*], Lord Wisdom [*ahurā ... mazdā*], are [*ahī*] the end [*irix tām*], the Most-Knowing One [*vaēdištō*].

* * * * *

And now, with all the above linguistic knowledge, you can compare, evaluate, and see in context, the translations of the entire verse, by each linguist in our group.

My translation:

'Of these wrongdoings, a knowing one professes none (to be) in the right, which through life, through glowing metal, he learns (for himself); through which (lessons) he has listened (to the Word of Wisdom); of which (Word), Thou Lord Wisdom, are the end, the Most-Knowing One.'

Insler 1975: "By reason of his correct conduct, a knowing person is never accused of those sins which are decreed to be capital, for which one has (already) been tried by molten iron, and of which Thou, Wise Lord, art the One who dost best know the consequences." Y32.7.

Humbach 1991: "I sincerely declare myself (to be) not at all conscious of any (instances of) such crimes which are called 'by violence', for which one becomes notorious by the (ordeal of) glowing metal, (and) for which Thou, O Wise Ahura, knowest best the net assets." Y32.7.

Humbach/Faiss 2010: "I explicitly declare to be not conscious of any such outrages which are called irremissible for/of which one becomes notorious (by the ordeal) with glowing metal (and) of which you know the outcome best, O Wise Lord." Y32.7.

Taraporewala 1951: "Among these sinners, they-understand not-anything about-progress through-effort, such-as is-taught by Life, just-like, they-say, through the Fiery-Test; Thou O Ahura, of such best-knowest the end, O Mazda." Y32.7.

Moulton 1912, and Bartholomae: "None of these sins will the understanding commit, in eagerness to attain the blessing that shall be proclaimed, we know, through the glowing metal ~ sins the issue of which, O Ahura Mazda, Thou knowest best." Y32.7

* * * * *

¹ None of the comments of Insler 1975, Humbach 1991, and Humbach/Faiss 2010 specifically describe the 'ordeal' as the one that pours molten metal on a person's chest to determine if he is telling the truth. But their translations treat this 'ordeal' as one that determines guilt, whereas the only 'ordeal' of molten metal mentioned in any Zoroastrian text (the Pahlavi *Bundahishn*) is not a test of truth-telling, or a test to determine guilt, but a purification process in which all the living will pass through molten metal at the end of times, to eliminate all the evil within existence.

² The Gathas are full of lovely alliterations. Alliterations make words sound musical, and are a feature of the poetry of the Gathas and indeed are also a feature of later prose Avestan texts and the Khordeh Avesta prayers, many of which have rhythm as well (e.g. the Ahmai Raeshcha, which is a quotation of Yy68.11). But sometimes, over the centuries as knowledge of the Avestan language became dim, (but Avestan texts were still chanted), the frequency of true alliteration resulted in some false alliterations, in that the pronunciation of a given word (which was not alliterative) was changed to sound like neighboring words ~ producing a false alliteration (the chanter not realizing the linguistic difference because knowledge of Avestan grammatical forms had just died out ~ following 2 devastating invasions in which texts were burned and the learned killed). Linguists believe there are a few such changed words in this verse, requiring that they be changed back (emended) to what the original form may have been. But all such emendations are essentially educated guesses, because even the finest linguists have no certain way for knowing what the original form may have been.

³ References to Skjaervo 2006 are to his on-line *Old Avestan Glossary*.

Insler 1975 ~ his translation and fts. are at pp. 46 - 47; his comments at pp. 203 - 204.

Humbach 1991 ~ his translation is in Vol. 1, p. 133; his comments in Vol. 2, p. 81.

Humbach/Faiss 2010 ~ their translation is at p. 92; their comments at p. 174.

Taraporewala 1951 ~ his translation is at p. 271; his comments at pp. 272 - 273; and he includes Bartholomae's English translation at p. 273.

Moulton 1912. His translation is at p. 356. His translation is identical to Bartholomae's English translation as shown in Taraporewala 1951.

⁴ Alliterations/assonance are the repetitions of sounds ~ consonants or syllables ~ that give a sentence a musical sound. They are a feature of the poetry of the Gathas and indeed also of later prose Avestan texts and the Khordeh Avesta prayers, many of which have rhythm as well (e.g. the Ahmai Raeshcha, which is a quotation of Yy68.11). But sometimes, over the centuries as knowledge of the Avestan language became dim, (but Av. texts were still chanted), the frequency of true alliteration/assonance resulted in some false ones, in that the pronunciation of a given word was changed to sound like neighboring words (the chanter not realizing the linguistic difference because knowledge of Avestan grammatical forms had just died out over the centuries ~ following 2 devastating invasions in which texts were burned and the learned killed). Linguists believe there are a few such changed words in this verse, requiring that they be changed back (emended) to what the original form may have been, in order to understand their meanings. But all such emendations are essentially educated guesses, because even the finest linguists have no certain way for knowing what the original form may have been.

⁵ See *Part Two: A Question of Reward & The Path*.

⁶ Many examples (showing that the verb 'to be' in its various conjugations, is implied in Gatha verses) are collected in a ft. in *Part Three: The Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu) An Analysis*.

⁷ See for example, the ellipses in the Ahuna Vairya (Yatha Ahu Vairyo), *Part One: The Manthra of Choices, Ahuna Vairya (Yatha Ahu Vairyo)*.

⁸ *x ratavō* is nom. pl. of the stem *x ratu-* (Skjaervo 2006). I translate *x ratu-* words as 'reason, reasoning'; see *Part Three: Xratu*.

⁹ Here is the full verse. "Since Thou, Wise One, at the beginning, didst fashion for us by Thy thinking creatures and conceptions and intentions, since Thou didst create body and breath, since (Thou didst creat) both actions and words [*šyaoθanācā sēnghqscā* acc. pl.], (all these things) whereby a person with volition expresses his preferences." Y31.11 Insler 1975. Here actions and words [*šyaoθanācā sēnghqscā* acc. pl.], are two in a list of material things through which a person with free will expresses his preferences, so in the context of Y31.11, *sēnghqscā* 'and words' would mean all kinds of 'words' ~ not limited to 'teachings'.

¹⁰ In the context of Y51.14, *sēnghāišcā* 'by their ... words' is explicitly equated with 'doctrine' and so means 'teachings'. Here is the full verse. "Neither are the Karpans our allies ... Theirs is a pleasure from (bringing) injury to the cow by their actions and their words [*sēnghāišcā*], a doctrine [*sēnghō*] which shall place them in the House of Deceit in the end [*apāməm*]" Y51.14, Insler 1975. The 'cow' is an allegory for the beneficial in mortal existence (detailed in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Cow & Its Network*).

The translation of *apāməm* as "in the end" in this verse has been influenced by religious paradigms that believe in a punitive hell in the afterlife. That (with respect) such translations choices are incorrect is detailed in *Part Three: Apema, One of Many Ends*, in which this verse is discussed.

¹¹ Skjaervo 2003, *Young Avestan*, Lesson 3. Although there are some differences between GAv. and YAv. many linguistic rules and meanings remain the same, as Skjaervo 2006 himself notes in his *Old Avestan*. This explanation of how the middle voice of this verb translates into English, is one of them.

¹² See *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*.

¹³ See in *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*; and *Molten, Glowing Metal*.

¹⁴ See *Part Three: Seraosha*.

¹⁵ The word order in GAv. is often different from the word order in English. The GAv. words *x'aēnā ayaṇhā* 'through glowing metal' appear at the end of line b., but since they are a metaphor for what we learn through the experiences of life, the meaning in English comes through more accurately by placing 'through glowing metal' after 'through life'.

¹⁶ Zarathushtra uses 'Lord' *ahura-* in the sense of one who has acquired lordship (or rule) over the qualities that make a being divine (*amesha spenta*); discussed in *Part Two: The Lords & The Equations of Y31.4*.

¹⁷ See *Part Two: A Question of Reward & The Path*.

¹⁸ Detailed in *Part One: The Identity of the Divine*.

¹⁹ Other verses which detail how Zarathushtra uses 'end' are discussed in *Part Six: Yasna Y51.9*, which is one of the other 'metal' verses in the Gathas.

²⁰ Here are some examples of the Divine and man ~ both being called 'knowing one *vīdvah-*' (in its various grammatical forms).

Wisdom: "...the Wise Lord, the Knowing One [*ahurō mazdā vīdvā* nom. sg.]..." Y29.6, Insler 1975;

"... the Wise Lord, the Knowing One [*vīdvā mazdā ... ahurō*]..." Y45.3, Insler 1975

"... the One who knows [*vīdušē* dat. sg.] ... Him who knows [*vīdušē* dat. sg.]" Y51.8, Insler 1975.

Wisdom and man: "... Let the Knowing One [*vīdvā* nom. sg.] speak to the knowing [*vīdušē* 'to the knowing one' dat. sg.]..." Y31.17, Insler 1975;

Man: "...the knowing man [*vīdvā* nom. sg.]..." Y31.6, Insler 1975;
 "... a knowing person [*vīdvā* nom. sg.]..." Y32.7 (our verse) Insler 1975;
 "...[of] Thy knowing follower [*vīdušō*]..." Y34.9, Insler 1975.

The words 'man', 'person', and 'follower' do not appear in the GAv. text. In these verses, the participle adj. 'knowing [*vīdvah-*]' (in its various grammatical forms) is used as a noun 'knowing-one'.

Other parallels between man and the Divine, are detailed in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Parallels*.

²¹ See in *Part Two: A Question of Reward & The Path*; and *Asha & The Checkmate Solution*.

²² See in *Part One: The Identity of the Divine*; and

In *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Singular & The Plural*; *A Question of Immanence*; *The Puzzle of Creation*; *Did Wisdom Choose Too?* and many other chapters in *Part Two*.

²³ Other reasons that make the metaphor so meaningful are explored in *Part Two: Molten, Glowing Metal*; and *Part Six: Yasna 51.9*.

²⁴ A picture of molten, glowing metal is appended to the chapter *Part Two: Molten, Glowing Metal*, so you can see the reality of how fiery and light filled it is.

²⁵ We see this conclusion quite clearly in Y43.4 in which fire delivers the reward for what is truthful as well, and therefore cannot be an instrument of punishment, but can only be an instrument of enlightenment, '*..(the) rewards which you give, through the heat of Thy truth-strong [*ašā.aojaṅhō*] fire, for (what is) untruthful and for (what is) truthful...*' Y43.4, my translation. See in *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*; and *The Houses of Heaven & Hell*; and in *Part Three: The Absence of Damnation & Hell in Other Avestan Texts*. And see *Part Two: Light, Glory, Fire*, which includes quotations from the YAv. *Atash Nyaish* which show fire as beneficent, a full source of healing, of knowledge, of wisdom, of the understanding that continues to grow which is not acquired by learning (i.e. the wisdom within).

²⁶ See *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*.

²⁷ "*dāθəmcā adāθəmcā*" are adjectives (Skjaervo 2006); therefore, their literal meaning are 'just and unjust'. But in more fluent English '(what is) just and (what is) unjust'. Here Zarathushtra is referring to Wisdom's judgments regarding qualities ~ not people (the just, and the unjust). See *Part Three: Ashavan & Dregvant*.

²⁸ Insler 1975 translates the words *cinvatō pərətā* in this verse as "Bridge of the Judge"; I agree with him (and Bartholomae) that the stem *cīnvant-* is pres. part. of of the verb *ci-* 'to decide, to discern' (p. 271). The present participle therefore would be translated as 'deciding, discerning'. I translate the term 'Bridge of Discerning', or 'Bridge of Deciding'. I think that the discerning, deciding, done at the metaphoric bridge is to discern, decide whether a soul has attained the true (correct) order of existence (*aša-*) completely (*haurvatāt-*), and therefore is able to make the transition from a mortal state of being to one that is no longer bound by mortality ~ *amərətāt-* 'non-deathness'. See *Part Three: Chinvat, The Bridge of Discerning*.

²⁹ See *Part One: Buried Treasure in Zoroastrian Stories* for a Pazand story of what happens when the soul reaches the (metaphoric) Bridge. The significance of this 'bridge' is discussed in *Chinvat, The Bridge of Discerning*. For the absence of such an ordeal or test in Avestan texts, see *Part Three: The Absence of Damnation & Hell in Other Avestan Texts*.

For what happens at the Chinvat Bridge in the Arda Viraf Namah, see *Part Three: Heaven & Hell in Pazand & Pahlavi Texts*.

³⁰ See *Part One: The Identity of the Divine*; and *Part Four: The Syncretization*.

³¹ Indeed, even in the aberrant YAv. *Vendidad*, whose chapters are full of horrific punishments, including death, it is the priestly establishment that administers these punishments through whippings, flayings, and killings ~ although they claim to have the authority of the Ahura Mazda to do so. But although written in YAv., the grammar of the *Vendidad* is so faulty that linguists have long since concluded that it could only have been composed after YAv. times, when the priests were no longer fluent in Avestan, (see *Part Three: The Absence of Damnation & Hell in Other Avestan Texts*; and *Part Five: The Vendidad, An Overview*).

³² See *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*.

³³ See *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*.

³⁴ See *Part Three: Heaven in Other Avestan Texts*.

³⁵ See E. W. West's Glossary & Index, p. 77, in his *The Book of the Mainyo-i-Khard*, under *frashegard*.

³⁶ See *Part Two: Molten, Glowing Metal*. In the *Bundahishn*, the purifying flood of molten metal occurs at the end of times as detailed in *Part Three: Heaven & Hell In Pazand & Pahlavi Texts*. In the Gathas, it is an on-going evolutionary process, as detailed in *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*.

³⁷ Detailed in *Part Three: Heaven & Hell in Pazand & Pahlavi Texts*.

³⁸ Moulton 1912, pp. 156 - 157, citing "Wisdom 2.24" ~ a text which his Table of Abbreviations does not identify.

³⁹ See *Part Two: The Houses of Heaven & Hell*, and *Part Three: Apema, One of Many Ends*.

⁴⁰ SBE 5, p. 126.

⁴¹ Skjaervo 2006; Beekes 1988, p. 137.

⁴² Skjaervo 2006 translates *aēnah-* as "sin" ntr.; Taraporewala 1951 states that when *aēnah-* is translated as "sinner" it is masc. (p. 157).

⁴³ Av. words may be used in different shades of meaning depending on the context (as English words also can). The following information is given to show both the shades of meaning that have been selected for *aēnah-* by our group of linguists, and also that the word has been translated as both conduct, and a person doing the conduct ~ because such options are relevant for the purpose of translating *aēnahqm* in our verse Y32.7. The grammatical values in these examples are not important for purposes of our discussion, but have been included just for completeness from Skjaervo 2006 *Old Avestan Glossary* [with bracketted values from his 2003 *Young Avestan Lessons*]. Bartholomae's translations appear in Taraporewala 1951. Some translations are 'free' ~ the English equivalent does not have the same grammatical value as the GAv. word.

aēnahqm gen. pl. [the gen. in Av. sometimes is translated into Eng. as an Eng. dat. 'to/for']

Insler 1975: "for ... sinners" Y30.8; "of ... sins" Y32.7; "for ... sins" Y32.8;

Humbach/Faiss 2010: "for ... outrages" Y30.8; "of ... outrages" Y32.7; "of ... outrages" Y32.8;

Taraporewala 1951: "for ... sins" Y30.8; "among ... sinners" Y32.7; "among ... sinners" Y32.8;

Moulton 1912 "of ... evil ones" Y30.8; "of ... sins" Y32.7; "in ... sins" Y32.8;

Bartholomae: "of ... sins" Y30.8; "of ... sins" Y32.7; "among ... sinners" Y32.8.

aēnahō gen. sg. [and possibly also abl.]

Insler 1975: "of ... offense" Y31.13; "from harming" Y31.15;

Humbach/Faiss 2010: "for ... sin" Y31.13; "outrage" Y31.15;

Taraporewala 1951: "for ... sin" Y31.13; "but-in-separating" Y31.15;

Moulton 1912 "for ... sin" Y31.13; "injury" Y31.15;

Bartholomae's translations are the same as Moulton's.

aēnaṅhē dat. sg. [and the infinitive form of the verb]

Insler 1975: "for ... harm" Y32.16; "to harm" (verb) Y46.7; "to harm" (verb) Y46.8;

Humbach/Faiss 2010: "to the outrage" Y32.16; "to outrage" (verb) Y46.7; "to outrage" (verb) Y46.8;

Taraporewala 1951: "in (their) violence" Y32.16; *aēnaṅhē* "with violence" (following mss. S1 and J3) Y46.7; "to harm" (verb) Y46.8;

Moulton 1912 "in (their) violence" Y32.16; "to injure" (verb) Y46.7; "to injure" (verb) Y46.8;

Bartholomae's translations are the same as Moulton's.

aēnā nom./ acc. pl.

Insler 1975: "sins" Y32.6

Humbach/Faiss 2010: *aēnā ēnāx štā* "peace-breaking outrages" Y32.6,

Taraporewala 1951: "sinner" Y32.6

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae: "sins" Y32.6

darəštā.aēnaṅhəm

Insler 1975: "of visible harm" Y34.4;

Humbach/Faiss 2010: "of visible injury" Y34.4

Taraporewala 1951: "sees through evil" Y34.4

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae: "with visible torment" Y34.4

⁴⁴ A perfect participle is formed (in English) by placing 'having' before the past participle of the given verb. For example, the following are perfect participles of their respective verbs.

'having done' (perf. participle of 'to do')

'having finished' (perf. participle of 'to finish').

Thus, the perfect participle of 'to know' would be 'having known'.

If a noun (literally) 'one having known', or in more fluent English 'a knowing one';

If an adj. literally a 'having known' person'; but in fluent English, a 'knowledgeable' person.

⁴⁵ As justification for his choice, Humbach 1991 cites Y50.11 *və staotā aojāi* "I will declare myself Your praiser". In that verse (Y50.11) according to Skjaervo 2006, the grammatical value of *aojāi* (subjunctive 1p sg.) is different from the grammatical value of *aojōi* (indicative 1p sg.) in our verse, but the underlying meaning 'to declare' is the same. In Avestan verbs and nouns, a given word form is often the form for more than one grammatical value.

⁴⁶ The Vedic sentence which Insler thinks is parallel, he translates as follows "Agni, if I have either been a person of false gods, or if I have wrongly **accused** (our) gods...".

I do not know if translators are universally agreed that "accused" is the only English equivalent of the applicable Ved. word. Nor do I know the context. But I see no compelling evidence that the phrase could not be translated as "Agni, if I have either been a person of false gods, or if I have wrongly **professed** gods...". There is nothing offered to show that the translation requires '**accused**' rather than '**professed**'. I therefore do not find the parallel persuasive. In fact it would be unusual for a human being to "accuse" a deity.

⁴⁷ Geldner's choice is *aojōi* but he shows the following mss. variations under Y32.7 ft. 2

aojō J3.7. K15. Lba. L3; (Tarap.'s preference)

aojōi S2;

aoj... S1; (unknown what Geldner meant by the string of dots)

...jōi J2; (unknown what Geldner meant by the string of dots)

āojōi K5;

"the rest *aojōi*". Geldner 1P p. 116. (Unknown how many mss. comprise "the rest").

⁴⁸ Skjaervo 2006 also shows the following grammatical forms for GAv. *aog-*.

aojāi (Skjaervo 2006 Sub. 1p sg. of *aog-* in Y50.11)

Insler 1975 "I will swear"

Humbach 1991 "I will declare myself"

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "I wish to declare myself"

Taraporewala 1951 "I would consider myself"

Moulton 1912 "will I declare myself" (simply a stylistic variation of Bartholomae's translation)

Bartholomae "I will declare myself".

aojī (Skjaervo 2006 Inj. 1p sg. of *aog-* in Y43.8)

Insler 1975 "I said..."

Humbach 1991 "I say ..."

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "I say..."

Taraporewala 1951 "I consider myself..."

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "I said..."

aogādā (Skjaervo 2006 Inj. 3p sg. of *aog-* in Y32.10)

Insler 1975 "[he] has asserted"

Humbach 1991 "[he] speaks"

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "[he] professes"

Taraporewala 1951 "he denounces"

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "he ... declares"

aogāmadaēcā (Skjaervo 2006 Ind. 1p pl. in YHapt.41.5 a later text in GAv.)

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "We declare ourselves [*aogāmadaēcā*] your praisers and poets..." YHapt. 41.5.

⁴⁹ Skjaervo in his 2006 Glossary, shows *naē* "not"; and the stem *naēci-* as an indef. pronoun, without identifying *naēcīt* in Y32.7. However, in his *Old Avestan*, Lesson 3, p. 27 shows *naēcīt* as an indefinite pronoun, **nom.** sg. **ntr.**

Jackson 1892 says that "The indefinite force is usually given in Av., as in Skt., by adding the particle *-cīt*, *-cīt*, as a suffix, but he does not show *naēcīt* § 408, pp. 116 - 117.

⁵⁰ M&dV, § 22.5, Paragraph 1, on p. 75. Their abbreviation 'avr.' stands for avestico reciente ~ which means YAv.

⁵¹ Beekes 1988, in his little table on p. 141.

⁵² Many examples which show that the verb 'to be' in its various conjugations, is implied in Gatha verses, are collected in a ft. in *Part Three: Yasna 27.14, Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu) An Analysis*.

⁵³ About the Ved. cognate: to a non-linguist, it may seem that the two words ~ GAv. *hādra-* and Ved. *sādhú* ~ are not at all similar. But the study of linguistics has developed certain rules regarding how certain consonants, vowels and combinations of the foregoing, are substituted for others as languages evolve (either linearly or laterally) ~ rules that have been developed through the study of many Indo-European languages, and are reasonably consistent.

⁵⁴ Webster's Pocket Dictionary, 2d ed. 2007.

⁵⁵ Jackson 1892 is in agreement, § 399, p. 114.

⁵⁶ Hintze's 1994 Glossary to her English translation of the *Zamyad Yasht* shows *jiv* 'to live' and *javaya-* as 'make alive, revive'. She also shows *javayō-* nom. sg. masc. present participle (active) *jiv*.

The present participle nom. sg. masc. would translate as '(a) living person'.

⁵⁷ Skjaervo 2003, *Young Avestan*, Lesson 3.

⁵⁸ Here are Insler's examples of the root *sanh-* being used in the sense of "declare or announce". In these examples *sahyāi* and *sānghaii* are simply different conjugations of the same (conjectured) stem, which Skjaervo 2006 shows as *sah-*:

"Someone like Thee should declare [*sahyāi*] to me how reverence is to be ..." Y44.1, Insler 1975;

"To them [*ārmaiti-*] announces [*sānghaii*] the judgments of Thy will [*xratəuš* 'reasoning']," Y43.6, Insler 1975;

And in a related way, as 'word, used together with 'action' or 'deed [*šyaoθana-*]' (examples have been detailed in the *Discussion* section above.

⁵⁹ This translation, which is longer to give you more context, is from Insler's translation of this verse in the Gathas section of his book, not from his commentary.

⁶⁰ See *Part One: A Teaching for all Mankind*.

⁶¹ See *Part One: The Freedom To Choose*; and *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution*.

⁶² Historically, the closest we come to any mention of religious intolerance before Sasanian times (that I am aware of), is in a stone inscription of the Achaemenian king Xerxes (who was the son of Darius the Great), who was not tolerant towards 'idolators'.

⁶³ Skjaervo 2006 *Old Avestan* Lesson 3, pp. 26 - 27; Jackson § 399, p. 114.

⁶⁴ Skjaervo 2003, *Young Avestan*, Lesson 3, pp. 17 - 18.

⁶⁵ The Av. word(s) for 'sun' are *hvar-* > *xʷəng-* (Skjaervo 2006). In Y32.2, Insler translates *xʷənvātā* as 'sunlike'. Regarding *xʷəna-* Skjaervo 2006 thinks its Ved. cognate is *suveni*. Taraporewala 1951 (commenting on *xʷənvātā* under Y32.2,) says that the Ved. *svanīka* is an epithet of the deity Agni ('fire'). Taraporewala 1951 pp. 258 - 259. So in the origins of *xʷəna-* we see the related ideas of 'glowing, fiery, sunlike'.

⁶⁶ In *Part Two: Molten, Glowing Metal*.

⁶⁷ Skjaervo 2006 *Old Avestan* Lesson 3, pp. 26 - 27; Jackson 1892 § 399, p. 114.

⁶⁸ Skjaervo 2003, *Young Avestan*, Lessons 12, 13, pp. 116, and following.

⁶⁹ Skjaervo does not show a gender for *irix ta-*; *a-* stem nouns and adjectives are generally masc./ntr. and *ā-* stems are generally fem. But there are exceptions to that rule.

⁷⁰ In GAv. and other languages of inflection like Latin, the verb 'to be' takes a nom. object, not an acc. one). Although in YAv., Jackson 1892 shows that the nom. sg. inflection of *a-* stem words is normally *-ō*, in GAv. both the nom. and acc. inflections are often *-əm* (for example in GAv., *ašəm* is nom./acc. of *aša-* an *a-* stem word, Skjaervo 2006), which supports Skjaervo's classification of *irix təm*, as nom. sg.

⁷¹ See *Part Two: A Question of Reward & The Path*, and *Part One: The Nature of the Divine*.

⁷² Here is Y44.2 in the Insler 1975 translation, in which *irix təm* also is used. Bear in mind, *ahu- vahišta-* the 'most good existence' is one of the terms which Zarathushtra uses for paradise ~ the state of being which is the true order of existence (*aša-*), which is the superlative degree of intrinsic goodness (*vahišta-*), which is the most good existence of the Divine (*aša- vahišta-*), and the paradise that mortals can attain (*ahu- vahišta-*). The words *aṅhəuš vahištahyā* are simply the gen. sg. forms of the stems *ahu- vahišta-*.

"This I ask Thee. Tell me truly, Lord. Is the beginning of the best existence [*ahu- vahišta-* 'most good existence'] in such a way that the loving man who shall seek after these things is to be saved? For such a person, [*spānta-* 'beneficial'] through truth [*aša-*], watching over the heritage [*irix tām* 'end'] for all is a world-healer and Thy ally in [*mainyu-* '(his) way of being'], Wise One." Y44.2.

Now we know from many verses in the Gathas, that the reward for following the path of the true order of existence (albeit imperfectly) is the true order of existence itself (perfected) ~ the *nature* of the means and the end are the same (see *Part Two: A Question of Reward & the Path*). I think in Y44.2, *irix tām* 'end' is used in the sense of a person who is beneficial through the true order of existence, who is a world-healer, is one who watches out for that end (the true order of existence), for all the living ~ 'watching over the end [*irix tām*] for all'.

⁷³ Insler, S. *The Ahuna Vairya Prayer* (in Monumentum H. S. Nyberg, Acta Iranica, E. J. Brill, 1975), p. 419.

⁷⁴ This technique of 'framing' or 'encapsulation' in the Gathas' syntax, to give one unit of thought, is discussed in the following chapters,

In *Part Three: The Ahuna Vairya (Yatha Ahu Vairyo) An Analysis* (discussed in great detail, with many examples); and

In *Part Six: Yasna 28.5* (discussed in some detail); *Yasna 30.7* (which has a double framing ~ one within another); *Yasna 51.9* (in which the framing extends over the ceasura); *Yasna 28.1* (discussed briefly); *Yasna 32.9* (discussed briefly); and *Yasna 44.16* (discussed briefly).

⁷⁵ Skjaervo 2006 shows *vaēdišta-* as a superlative (adj.) which he thinks means 'who finds most often' believing that it is derived from *vaēda-* 'finder, owner' ~ both words presumably (in his opinion) deriving from *vaēd-* 'to find'), and he shows *vaēdištō* used in our verse (Y32.7) and in Y46.19 as the nom. sg. form of the superlative (adj.) *vaēdišta-* 'who finds most often'. But the meaning 'to find' and words derived from it, are not relevant to the context of line c. of our verse. He does not show *vaēdišta-* as a superlative adjective derived from the verb *vaēd-* 'to know'. But the same linguistic rules would apply.

⁷⁶ Beekes 1988 p. 136.

⁷⁷ Geldner 1P p. 116.

⁷⁸ Taraporewala comments that *ahī* is "metrically an extra". Actually, if you compare the meters of the various Gatha ~ Yasna by Yasna, verse by verse, you will see that their meters are not rigidly exact (just as the meter of English poetry is not rigidly exact). Even in a given meter, the Gatha lines vary in the number of their syllables, as well as in their emphasized beats and light beats. A few examples are shown in Skjaervo 2006, *Old Avestan*, Lesson 1, pp. 6 - 8. Skjaervo just shows the number of syllables (each marked as an x) before and after the ceasura (he marks with a straight vertical line |. I mark it with a diagonal /). He does not differentiate between emphasized and light beats. I prefer to do so, because that is the way the verses are chanted ~ with light and emphasized beats ~ which forms their rhythm. The patterns ~ in each line, and from line to line ~ are sometimes the same, and sometimes have subtle variations, which add interest to the rhythmic quality. And I think the similarities and variations of the syllables and beats would have been tied into the music of these songs as originally sung ~ music now lost to us. Take any song with a melody (an old Cole Porter song, like "I've got you under my skin..."), plot out the light and emphasized beats in a line, and compare that with the melody to which that line is sung, and you will see what I mean.

Here are lines a. b. and c. of our verse (Y32.7). As you can see, lines a. and c. both have a total of 18 syllables, with each line having the same number of syllables before the ceasura, and each line having the same number after the ceasura ~ with some variations between the light and emphasized beats (x = a light beat; | = an emphasized beat). So I cannot agree with Taraporewala that *ahī* in line c. is a metrical extra. Here I give

aojōi 3 syllables (*a-o-jōi*) because I think *jōi* would be pronounced as one syllable ~ the *ō* being long, and the *i* being short.

- a. *aēšqm aēnaṅḥqm* / *naēcīt vīdvā aojōi hādrōyā*
 1x 1 1xx 1 1x 1 1x 1 1x 1 18 syllables 7 / 11
- b. *yā jōyā sēnghaitē* *yāiš srāvī x^vaēnā ayaṅhā*
 x 1x 1xx 1x 1x 1x 1 1x 1 16 syllables 6 / 10
- c. *yaēšqm tū ahurā* / *irix təm mazdā vaēdištō ahī*
 1x 1 x 1x1 1x 1 1x 1xx 1 x1 18 syllables 7 / 11.

⁷⁹ Jackson 1892 shows that for *a-* stem nouns and adjs. the GAv. gen. sg. inflection would be *-hyā*, showing as his example *yasnahyā* (§ 239, p. 71) and we see many such examples of the gen. sg. in *a-* stem nouns ~ for example, the gen. sg. *ašahyā* of the ntr. stem *aša-*. The following examples are from the Insler 1975 translation:

"in quest of truth [*ašahyā*]" Y28.4;

"the creatures of truth [*ašahyā*]" Y31.1;

"the sight of truth [*ašahyā*]" Y32.13;

"the pasture of truth [*ašahyā*]" Y33.3;

"the companion of truth [*ašahyā*]" Y34.10; and there are many, many more.