

Yasna 46.6 c. d. e.

Lines c. d., and e. of this verse have been translated in ways that are diametrically opposed to Zarathushtra's teachings. So we need to re-visit their translation to see if we can ascertain his intent.

Why is this important?

Because in line e., (the last line of this verse) Zarathushtra tells us that lines c. and d. contain the **foremost envisionments** of the Divine ~ envisionments which are so relevant in our own times in which a widespread disregard for (factual) truth seems to have become an accepted norm ~ in the seats of power, in the media, on the internet. The fabric of our society is undermined by the disease of falsehood.

Now, it may seem odd to you that in this chapter I translate only lines c., d., and e. of our verse (Y46) ~ especially since I so often insist that the meanings of words need to be understood in the micro context of the whole verse in which they appear.

Well, in this instance I am unable to do so, because the omitted lines a. and b. of our verse are tied into the immediately preceding verse (Y46.5) all of which have not yet been successfully decoded (in my view). So neither Y46.5 nor the first 2 lines (a. and b.) of our verse are of any help (at this time) in solving puzzles raised by translations of Y46 lines c. and d. by the linguists in our group. I have footnoted here a brief explanation, as well as translations by our group of linguists of the immediately preceding verse (Y46.5) and lines a. and b. of our verse (Y46.6), so that you can judge for yourself.¹

I have to admit: lines c. and d. puzzled me for the longest time. The process of solving this puzzle was difficult, but ultimately involved Eureka! moments (which are not apparent when we first read lines c. and d.). Line c. in particular presents a mini puzzle of its own (discussed below). And although at first glance line e. seems quite simple and straightforward, it too contains a mini puzzle. I hope you enjoy these puzzles. More to the point, I hope they prove meaningful to you.

The translations and comments of our group of translators are referenced here to avoid repeated citations,² and their translations are given in full at the end of this chapter, so that you can see them in context, and compare their translation choices.

a. ...

b. ...

c. *hvō. zī. drəgvā.* / *yā. drəgvāitē. vahištō.*

d. *hvō. ašavā.* / *yahmāi. ašavā. fryō.*

e. *hyaṭ daēnā* / *paouruyā dā ahurā* Y46.6 Geldner 1P p. 161.

My translation

a. ...

b. ...

c. 'That indeed (is) false which to falsehood (is) most-good;

d. That (is) truthful, to which (being) truthful (for its own sake is) dear;

e. which (are) the foremost envisionments you have given O Lord.' Y46.6.

Discussion.

At first thought, you may not think that the statements in lines c. and d. justify the conclusion in line e. that they are the 'foremost envisionments' that the Divine has given to us. But withhold judgment, while we consider these lines.

Line c. *hvō zī drəgvā yē drəgvāitē vahištō*

'That indeed (is) false which to falsehood (is) most good;' A brief, word by word linguistic analysis is footnoted.³

A key to understanding the mini puzzle in this line c. is the last word in the line ~ *vahištō* 'most good'.

How so?

Well, *vahišta-* is the superlative degree of intrinsic goodness. And *vahišta-* words are used in the Gathas almost as a code word, or a word of art. This has been explored in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Most Good, Vahishta*, in which I show that *vahišta-* words are used for the Divine, for the qualities that make a being divine (amesha spenta), for the path of these qualities, and for the reward for following that path (the state of being that is the complete attainment of these qualities),⁴ ~ each being the superlative degree of intrinsic goodness.

And the term *ahu- vahišta-* 'an existence [*ahu-*] that is the superlative degree of intrinsic goodness [*vahišta-*], is a term for 'paradise' in the Gathas and in YAv. texts.⁵ Indeed, Av. *vahišta-* became the Pazand/Pahlavi *vahesht*, and the later Persian *behesht* ~ both meaning paradise,⁶ although by then, the notion of 'paradise' had become a place, rather than a state of being (as it is in the Gathas and some YAv. texts).⁷

In short, in the Gathas and even in later texts, *vahišta-* intrinsic goodness, and the true order of existence ('truth' for short) are inseparable. The Divine (truth personified), the path of truth, and its reward (truth personified, paradise) are *aša- vahišta-* ~ an existence that is the superlative degree of intrinsic goodness.

So with this understanding of how *vahišta-* is used in the Gathas, it surprised and puzzled me that a *vahišta-* word appears in line c. in association with *drəgvant-* words which (literally) mean 'possessing untruth'.⁸ None of the ways in which line c. has been translated by our group of linguists fits the meaning of *vahišta-* as the superlative degree of intrinsic goodness, let alone the ways in which it is used in the Gathas (for the nature of the Divine, the path, and its reward).

An inconsistency? An aberration? Well no. Zarathushtra was playing with words to intrigue, alert us, challenge our thinking (as he so often does).

True, what follows is just my interpretation. But so too is every translation of this line by eminent linguists an interpretation, because of ambiguities inherent in the GAv. language itself. So I ask that you consider with an open mind, my interpretations, and those of the linguists in our group. Then decide for yourself.

Because of inherent ambiguities in the Avestan language, to ascertain Zarathushtra's intent we need to choose linguistic alternatives that are consistent with his system of thought, and with what he was trying to accomplish in his society (as shown in the Gathas). I will not weary you with linguistic

details (which in this chapter I have relegated to footnotes). I will simply summarize linguistic alternatives here, because they are necessary for you to understand these lines.

First, there is no verb in line c. But verbs often are implied in Avestan.⁹ So what verb did Zarathushtra intend to imply in line c.?

Well, (with certain exceptions), a sentence usually has a **subject (nom.)**, a verb, and **an object (acc.)**. For example: **The girl** (subject, **nom.**) kicked (verb) **the ball** (object, **acc.**). But the words in this line, *hvō*, *drəgvā*, and *vahištō* are each **nom. sg.** (Skjaervo 2006). Now it is unlikely that one sentence would have 3 subjects (**nom.**) so it is likely that some of these nom. words are used as the object of an implied verb, and there is only one verb that can have an object in the nom. case, and that is the verb 'to be', (and its various conjugations).¹⁰ The verb 'to be' often is implied in GAv. and an implied '(is)' fits the context of this line, as all translators in our group agree (although not all of them place this implied verb in round parentheses).

Finally in line c., the words *hvō*, *drəgvā*, *drəgvāitē*, and *vahištō* in Avestan, can be used for more than one meaning.

hvō is a demonstrative pronoun 'that', 'yonder' (Skjaervo 2006). So *hvō* could mean 'that (thing)' including a concept, or conduct, or 'that (person)'. And in Avestan, demonstrative pronouns can also be used for a 3p pronoun,¹¹ therefore masc./ntr. *hvō* could be translated as 'he' or 'it'. So which meaning did Zarathushtra intend here:

- ~ 'that (thing concept, conduct)'?
- ~ 'that (one person)'?
- ~ 'he'?
- ~ 'it'?

Let us set that question on the back burner for the time being.

drəgvā is nom. sg., and *drəgvāitē* is dat. sg. ('to/for ___') of the stem *drəgvant-* an adjective. Its literal meaning is 'possessing untruth' but in fluent English, 'possessing untruth' can be awkward, and we sometimes have to settle for the English adjectives 'untruthful' or 'false' in translating *drəgvant-* words.

In Avestan this adjective can be (and often is) also used as a noun (a person, a concept, or other thing) that has the quality of the adjective.¹² So which option did Zarathushtra intend, in using each of these words?

An adj. 'false, untruthful' ?

A noun (person) 'false one, untruthful one' ?

A noun (concept) 'falsehood, untruthfulness' ?

A noun (conduct) 'false thing untruthful thing' ?

vahištō is nom. sg. of the stem *vahišta-* 'most good' ~ an adjective, which can be (and is) used as a noun (a person, concept, or thing) that is 'most good'. So which option did Zarathushtra intend in using *vahištō*?

An adj. 'most good' ?

A noun (person) 'most good one' ?

A noun (concept) '(what is) most good'?

A noun (conduct) 'most good thing' ?

Now the context of an earlier verse Y46.4 makes it clear that a *drəgvant-* word is used as a person and his conduct. In addition, although the immediately preceding verse (Y46.5) and the first two lines of our verse (Y46.6a. and b.) have not yet been decoded (in my view), in currently available translations by linguists, they also seem to be about people and their conduct. So at first thought, it may seem that in lines c. and d. Zarathushtra must have also used forms of the adjs. *drəgvant-*, *vahišta-* and *ašavan-* as nouns that are people and their conduct, actions, rather than concepts. But I disagree. I have opted for nouns that are concepts for the following reasons.

1. Concepts express qualities that are absolutes, whereas people (and their actions) are a mix of more good and bad (Y30.3), more beneficial and harmful (Y45.2), more truthful and false;
2. And here (as so often in other verses),¹³ Zarathushtra is expressing principles (which are concepts). That he is using *drəgvant-*, *vahišta-* and *ašavan-* as nouns that are concepts (in lines c. and d.) is supported by the following facts. He uses *daēnā* 'envisionments' in line e. (referring to the statements in lines c. and d.). Envisionments are concepts. And he goes a step further. In line e. he calls lines c. and d. *paouruyā* the 'first' or 'foremost' envisionments of the Lord (who is Wisdom) '*... which (are) the foremost envisionments [daēnā paouruyā] you have given O Lord.*' Y46.6e, my translation.

Yet the translation choices in lines c. and d. by the linguists in our group cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be called 2 of the most important (*foremost*) envisionments of the Divine in the Gathas.

I will give you their translation choices, the reasons why they do not satisfy me, as well as the linguistic choices I have made, so that you can decide for yourself which linguistic choices represent important envisionments of the Divine (in Zarathushtra's view) and therefore reveal his intent in crafting lines c. and d.

Line c. *hvō zī drəgvā / yā drəgvāitē vahištō.*

My translation. 'That [*hvō*] indeed [*zī*] (is) false [*drəgvā*] which [*yā*] to falsehood [*drəgvāitē*] (is) most good [*vahištō*];

Insler 1975. "For that person [*hvō*] is deceitful [*drəgvā*] who is extremely good [*vahištō*] to the deceitful man [*drəgvāitē*];

Humbach 1991. "For that one [*hvō*] (counts as) deceitful [*drəgvā*] who is best [*vahištō*] to the deceitful one [*drəgvāitē*];

Humbach/Faiss 2010. "That one [*hvō*] indeed [*zī*] (counts as) deceitful [*drəgvā*] who is very good/dear [*vahištō*] to the deceitful one [*drəgvāitē*];

Taraporewala 1951. "because [*zī*] he-himself [*hvō*] (is) wicked [*drəgvā*] who (is) best-intentioned [*vahištō*] to-the-follower-of-Untruth [*drəgvāitē*];

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae. "For he [*hvō*] is himself a Liar [*drəgvā*] who is very good [*vahištō*] to a Liar [*drəgvāitē*];

The interpretations of our translators seem to have been informed by the ways in which 'good' and its superlative 'most good', (or 'very good' or 'best') are used in English today ~ many of which have nothing to do with intrinsic goodness ~ because as you can see, in all their translations *vahištō* is an activity of a deceitful person in the sense of being supportive of evil, promoting it, enabling it to

flourish. Indeed, Humbach/Faiss 2010 express the opinion in their commentary that "*vahištō* 'best' is used here as a term of social relations." They cite no supporting evidence for their interpretation.

The only way in which *vahišta-* is used in the Gathas (and in many YAv. passages), is as the superlative degree of intrinsic goodness (*vohu-*), ~ which may indeed have been the more ancient meaning of 'most good' in English as well.

True, these translations are consistent with some of the many the ways in which 'most good' or 'very good' or 'best' are used *today in English*. But in all the many instances in which *vahišta-* words are used in the Gathas I have found no evidence that they are used in any of the ways in which our translators have translated *vahištō* here, as the false activity or belief of a deceitful person.¹⁴ Nor have any of our linguists pointed to any parallel usage in support of their various interpretations.

In addition, their interpretations are not consistent with the Gathas, in which *vahišta-* is equated with the true (wholly good) order of existence (*aša- vahišta-*), which by definition cannot be false, deceitful ~ it being the opposite of *druj-* 'falsehood, untruth, deceit'. And *ašavan-* (the adj. for *aša-*) is the opposite of *drəgvant-* 'false, untruthful, deceitful' (the adj. for *druj-*).¹⁵

If we were to give *vahišta-* in line c. the meaning it has in the Gathas, the translations of most of our linguists would in effect say that a person is false (*drəgvā*) who acts in an intrinsically most good (*vahištō*) way towards one who is false (*drəgvāitē*). This is not only a contradiction in terms (an oxymoron), it is contrary to Zarathushtra's most basic teachings.

How can it ever be false to offer honesty, compassion, justice (qualites inherent in *aša-* which is intrinsically most good *vahišta-*) to any person, however 'bad' he may be (especially since we all are a mix of 'more good' and 'bad' qualities in varying degrees)? How can it ever be false to be in accord with the true order of existence (*aša-* which is equated with *vahišta-* intrinsic goodness in the superlative degree)?¹⁶

I think the problems with these translations arise from two factors.

(1) They have selected translation options that are persons, instead of concepts, which in this context makes it impossible to give *vahištō* the meaning it has in the Gathas, and

(2) they have imported into the meaning of *vahištō*, today's English meanings that do not mean intrinsic goodness ~ which is the only way in which *vohu-* and its superlative *vahišta-* are used in the Gathas,¹⁷

But by choosing (linguistically accurate) alternatives, line c. can be translated in a way that is consistent with Zarathushtra's thought, and as an added dividend, results in a cryptic, multi-dimensional mini puzzle that expresses ideas that are indeed foundations of his thought ~ the **foremost envisionments** of the Lord (as line e. tells us). Here again is my translation of line c.

Line c. *hvō zī drəgvā / yē drəgvāitē vahištō.*

'That indeed (is) false which to falsehood (is) most-good'.

At first thought, its meaning seems quite basic and obvious ~ a play on words ~ what to falsehood is very good, is false, which is accurate because falsehood by definition cannot include anything that is not false. Now Zarathushtra could have conveyed the same idea without using the word *vahištō* 'most good', which in the Gathas he uses almost as a code word, or word of art ~ for the nature of the Divine (truth), the path (truth), and its reward (truth).¹⁸ This would have alerted those who

knew his teachings well, that he was not just having fun with a play on words, but was presenting a mini puzzle for their entertainment and enlightenment.

In our line c. by choosing *vahištō* and saying what to falsehood is most good (*vahištō*) ~ Zarathushtra suggests the same three-fold areas of belief which he rejected as false in his society ~

- (i) the nature of the deities worshipped,
- (ii) the nature of the path, the worship followed by their followers, and
- (iii) the nature of the promised rewards.

His rejection of these 3 areas of belief have been detailed in other chapters. So I will just summarize them here.¹⁹

1. The nature of the deities worshipped in Zarathushtra's culture, were a mix of good and evil qualities. They are portrayed as being full of rage, cruelty, predatory violence, bringing calamities and suffering on those who displeased them. He rejected this notion of the Divine as false, implying in line c. (by using his code word *vahištō*) that it is false to think that deities who were a mix of good and bad, are what he describes the Divine to be ~ most good *vahišta-*.

2. The path pursued by the followers of these deities was also that of greed, predatory violence, cruelty, tyranny, oppression, bondage, dishonesty, theft, murder etc. And the way to worship these deities was through bribery ~ extravagant material gifts ~ thousands of horses, cattle, etc. and expensive rituals. Zarathushtra rejected this path, and this way to worship, as false, implying in line c. that it is false to think that a path of such evil qualities (the opposite of the true (good, correct) order of existence), and such a way to worship, are most good, *vahišta-*. In his view, the path required by a deity worthy of worship (Wisdom) is the path of truth, and the way to worship Wisdom, is with Its own qualities ~ truth, its comprehension, its embodiment, its rule, the beneficial way of being.²⁰

3. The promised reward for the followers of the deities of Zarathushtra's culture was the fulfillment of material wishes ~ winning battles, attaining wealth, property, power, kingship, abundant harvests, having children to perpetuate one's line, etc. Zarathushtra celebrates the material world as good, to be enjoyed.²¹ But he rejects as false the idea that material things are the ultimate 'reward'. To Wisdom, the reward for taking the path of the true order of existence is the attainment of such an existence (which is 'most good' *aša- vahišta-*) ~ the paradise of a 'most good existence' *ahuvahišta-*.

So in line c., by using the cryptic *vahištō* 'most-good', with a play on words, Zarathushtra makes a statement ~ 'That indeed (is) false which to falsehood (is) most-good' ~ in these 3 areas of belief for which he uses *vahišta-* words ~ the Divine, Its path, and Its reward. A multi-dimensional line. A mini-puzzle. But one which results in a Eureka! moment if one knows how *vahišta-* is used in the Gathas (and some later texts). Let us now look at line d.

Line d. *hvō ašavā / yahmāi ašavā fryō.*

d. That (is) truthful to which (being) truthful (for its own sake) (is) dear;

Line d. also has no verb, and we have to imply forms of the verb 'to be' for the same reasons given for line c., because *hvō*, *ašavā*, and *fryō* are all nom.

Here are the translation choices that our translators have made for line d.

Insler 1975. "and that person [*hvō*] is truthful [*ašavā*] for whom [*yahmāi*] the truthful man [*ašavā*] is a friend [*fryō*];

Humbach 1991; and Humbach/Faiss 2010 "that one [*hvō*] (counts as) truthful [*ašavā*] to whom [*yahmāi*] a truthful one [*ašavā*] (is) a friend [*fryō*]."

Taraporewala 1951. "(and) he-indeed [*hvō*] (is) righteous [*ašavā*] to whom [*yahmāi*] the Truthful-one [*ašavā*] (is) dear [*fryō*];

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae. "he [*hvō*] is a righteous man [*ašavā*] to whom [*yahmāi*] a righteous man [*ašavā*] is dear;".

With respect, these translation options do not accord with reality, nor with Zarathushtra's teachings, (except for similarly interpretive translations).²² A person is not truthful (or righteous) just because he has a truthful (or righteous) person for a friend, or because he holds a truthful (or righteous) person dear, or because a truthful person holds him dear. A person might love a truthful or righteous person and still be one who is very much a wrongdoer, opting to make repeated wrongful choices. Nor is a person truthful simply because he loves the Divine ("the Truthful-one"). Nor is a person truthful simply because he is loved by a truthful person.

In Zarathushtra's thought, to become truthful (an incremental process) we have to *be* truthful, we have to make truthful, good, correct, choices in thought, word, and action. Once again, I think the problem with these translations arises from the fact that they have picked translation options that are persons, rather than concepts.

Let us consider alternatives for line d. *hvō ašavā / yahmāi ašavā fryō* (that are linguistically accurate).

Despite the fact that the structures of lines c. and d. seem to parallel (certain) opposites, they are not true opposites ~ neither in grammar nor in meaning. True, both lines start with *hvō*, and we have the opposites *drəgvā* 'false/untruthful' in line c., and *ašavā* 'truthful' in line d. But there are material differences in these 2 lines.

In line c. the relative pronoun *yā* is nom. sg., in line d. it is dat. sg. *yahmāi* 'to/for which', 'to/for whom', 'to/for that'.

In line c. *drəgvant-* words appear twice ~ first as *drəgvā* (nom. sg.) and the 2d time as *drəgvāitē* (dat. sg.); whereas in line d. an *ašavan-* word also appears twice ~ but both times as *ašavā* (nom. sg.). There is no dat. sg. *ašavan-* word in line d.; therefore there is no true parallel (as opposites) between the two *drəgvant-* words in line c. and the two *ašavan-* words in line d.

And in line c. Zarathushtra uses *vahištō*, a multi-dimensional word of art in the Gathas; whereas in line d. he uses *fryō*, which is a lovely word (used in the Gathas in lovely ways), but does not have the same meaning or significance (almost as a code word, or word of art) as does *vahištō*.

In my view, the apparent parallels were Zarathushtra playing with words and poetic techniques (just as words that rhyme are parallels in sound ~ a poetic technique ~ without being parallels in meaning).

In line d. (as in line c.) I have not translated *hvō* as a person; and for the adjectives *ašavā* and *fryō* I translate them as nouns which are qualities, concepts (not persons) ~ options which are linguistically accurate, are consistent with Zarathushtra's teachings, and solve the problems created by the translations of line d. detailed above. Thus,

Line d. *hvō ašavā / yahmāi ašavā fryō*
 'that (is) truthful, to which (being) truthful (for its own sake is) dear',

Linguistic details are footnoted.²³

The implied words. Here I have implied forms of the frequently implied Avestan verb 'to be'. But why have I also implied '(for its own sake)'? Because it helps to clarify the thought expressed in line d. which is indeed one of Zarathushtra's most important teachings ~ that we should love being truthful for truth's own dear sake. We see this idea repeatedly expressed in the Gathas,²⁴ and it is expressed in the Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu) manthra ~ one of the most important manthras in Zoroastrianism, last line of which expresses the idea of **truth for (the sake of) the most good truth**.²⁵ And I think line d. of our verse (Y46.6) expresses the same idea ~ which in the next line is called one of the '**foremost envisionments**' of the Lord. Returning to line d.

fryō is nom. sg. of the stem *frya-* which is an adjective (Skjaervo 2006), that also can be (and is) used as a noun. Here I translate it as an adjective (as do Taraporewala 1951, Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae who translate *fryō* in line d. as 'dear'). Our other translators have translated *fryō* here as a noun 'friend'.

Regarding its meaning: In other Gatha verses (in various declensions) *frya-* is used often to describe the relationship between the Divine and man ~ that of a '**friend to a friend**' or a '**beloved to a beloved**'.²⁶ In the Gathas, 'love' is a central feature in the relationship between man and the Divine.²⁷

In English, the adjs. 'friendly', 'dear', 'beloved' while not identical in meaning, reflect different flavors and strengths of an underlying meaning ~ affection (love). Those to whom we feel 'friendly' are 'dear' to us (although not all friends might be 'beloved'). To be 'beloved' is to be 'dear' (although 'beloved' is a stronger expression of affection than 'dear'). So the question arises ~ in the GAv. mind-set, what meaning did *frya-* have? Did that one word include all these flavors of affection ~ 'friendly', 'dear', 'beloved'? Although the evidence is not conclusive, I think that the ways in which *frya-* is used in the Gathas supports that conclusion ~ as evidenced by many translations of other verses in which *frya-* words are used.

Some translators have translated *frya-* only as 'friendly' (adj.) or 'friend' (adj. used as a noun) in all verses. Others have translated the word as 'friendly' or 'friend' in some verses and as 'loving', or 'beloved' or 'lover' in other verses. And some have translated it as 'beloved / lover', in all verses.²⁸ In light of the fact that Zarathushtra has a passion for truth, and loves truthfulness for its own sake (a fundament of his thought), I have opted to give the adj. *fryō* in line c. an expression of the underlying feeling it represents ~ 'dear' as in a love of truth for its own sake ~ although the stronger flavor, 'beloved', would be equally valid.

This flavor of meaning for *fryō* as 'dear' is corroborated in the GAv. A *Airyema Ishyo*, Y54.1 which speaks of the dear reward of truth, (using a word other than *frya-*).

'... I ask for the dear reward of truth, which Lord Wisdom, awards.' Y54.1, my translation (which together with other translations ~ not all in agreement ~ are explored in another chapter).²⁹

(Parenthetically, in connection with who/what awards the dear reward of truth in the A *Airyema Ishyo* Y54.1 above, think about the double meaning of Lord and Wisdom/wisdom. The ways in which Zarathushtra uses 'Lord' in the Gathas is discussed below in connection with its use in line e. of our verse Y46.6).

ašavā is nom. sg. of the adj. stem *ašavan-*. I take *ašavā* as an adj. ~ its original grammatical value ~ and translate it 'truthful'. Thus,

Line d. *hvō ašavā / yahmāi ašavā fryō*

'that [*hvō*] (is) truthful [*ašavā*], to which [*yahmāi*] (being) truthful [*ašavā*] (for its own sake is) dear [*fryō*].'

These translation options are linguistically accurate, and express a core teaching of Zarathushtra ~ truth for truth's own dear sake, and are confirmed by line e. which describes the precepts in lines c. and d. as the premier, the foremost, envisionments given by the Lord (who is Wisdom).

This interpretation is corroborated 4 verses later (in Y46.10) which explicitly speaks of truth for truth's own sake (without need for any interpretation). I footnote the Insler 1975 translation of that verse in full, so that you can see for yourself that this is so.³⁰ Let us now look at line e.

Line e. *hyaṭ daēnā paouruyā dā ahurā*

which (are) the foremost envisionments you have given, Lord.

A linguistic analysis of this line is footnoted.³¹ The translators in our group have chosen the following translation options.

Insler 1975 "ever since Thou didst establish the first conceptions, Lord."

Humbach 1991 "since Thou didst establish religious views to be primal, O Ahura."

Humbach/Faiss 2010 "as you established the views/religions (to be) fundamental, O Lord."

Taraporewala 1951 "ever since Thou-didst-create (our) original Inner-Selves, O Ahura."

Bartholomae "since thou hast created men's Selves in the beginning, O Ahura."

Moulton's 1912 translation is the same as Bartholomae's English translation.

Insler 1975, Taraporewala 1951, Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae translate *hyaṭ* as "ever since" and "since", indicating time ~ that the two foregoing ideas became truths only from the time the Lord designated them as such.

Humbach 1991 translates *hyaṭ* as "since" in the sense of 'because' ~ indicating that the two foregoing ideas are truths because the Lord established them as such.

And Humbach/Faiss 2010 translates *hyaṭ* as "as" ~ I am not quite sure of their intent in choosing the ambiguous "as" (in the sense of 'because'? or 'ever since'? something else?).

With respect, I do not agree that either of these two ways of translating *hyaṭ* in line e. are consistent with Zarathushtra's thought. There is ample evidence in the Gathas that in Zarathushtra's view the envisionments in the two preceding lines are eternal truths in their own right ~ in and of themselves ~ generated, (given) by a quality of being ~ Lord (explained below).

I therefore translate *hyaṭ* as "which" ~ a relative pronoun standing for the preceding ideas in lines c. and d., thus '- which (are) the foremost envisionments ...'

daēnā in the Gathas means 'envisionments' as in 'ways of looking at things (paradigms),' ~ such as envisioning the nature of the Divine, Its path, Its reward, each as wholly good, envisioning that truth is beloved, and that we should be truthful for truth's own dear sake. Centuries later, *daēnā* evolved to mean the religion itself. The meaning(s) ascribed to *daēnā-* by various linguists have been detailed and examined in another chapter.³²

paouruyā. In the Gathas (as in English), the word *paouruyā* 'first' is used in more than one way ~ 'first in time' (as in *primeval*), first in type (as in *fundamental*), 'first in quality' (as in *a diamond of the first water*), first in importance (as in *prime*, or *premier*), and in other ways as well.³³ I think Zarathushtra uses *paouruyā* here as 'first in quality and first in importance' ~ thus 'foremost' ~ referring to the ideas (the 'envisionments') in lines c. and d., specifically:

In line c. ~ that it is false to think that what is most good (*vahištō*) ~ the nature of the divine, Its path/worship, its reward ~ are a mix of good and evil, and are primarily material,³⁴ and

Line d. ~ that it is truthful to be truthful for truth's own dear sake.

dā. There is no dispute that *dā* is a 2p form of the verb *dā-* 'to give, to make, to establish'. So *dā* means 'you have given', or 'you have made', or 'you have established' ~ each of which fits the context, because (in Zarathushtra's view) the principles in lines c. and d. are truths that are wisdom generated. They are made, given and established by wisdom. But the word (or name) 'wisdom' (*mazdā-*) does not appear in this line e.

Which brings us to 'Lord'.

ahurā. There is no dispute that *ahurā* is voc. sg. of the stem *ahura-* 'lord'. So here (as so often in Gatha verses) Zarathushtra is communicating with the Divine directly, in the language of his time and culture ~ not through a ritual formula, not even as part of a ritual. Just a direct communication '... the foremost envisionments you have given, Lord.' Y46.6 (which he also uses as a teaching device ~ a way of expressing his system of thought).

Now, the name he uses most often for the Divine is 'Wisdom'.³⁵ And it is wisdom that generates the envisionments in lines c. and d. So it puzzled me why here he chooses to call the Divine 'Lord' ~ a name he uses less frequently ~ when Wisdom would have been a better fit. I think it was his intent to intrigue and puzzle his followers, because he wanted them to figure out why, thus leading them to another mini puzzle. Am I speculating? Surely ~ but based on the evidence of the Gathas. Even so, I could be wrong. See what you think.

vahišta- in the Gathas applies to the *nature* of the Divine. But this mini puzzle involves Zarathushtra's understanding of (i) the *identity* of the Divine, which bears on (ii) the ways in which he uses 'lord' (*ahura-*) in the Gathas ~ both of which have been detailed in other chapters,³⁶ which I will summarize here without quoting all the evidence.

In the Gathas, Zarathushtra repeatedly uses 'Lord' as one who has acquired lordship over the true (good, correct) order of existence, its comprehension, its embodiment in thought, word and action, its rule ~ the qualities that make a being divine (*amesha spenta*). And he defines 'Wisdom' in the same way ~ as one who has attained completely, the qualities that make a being divine (*amesha spenta*).³⁷ So again we have to wonder: Why did he not just use Wisdom in line e. as the giver of those *foremost envisionments*? Why did he choose 'Lord'? Well, let us take it a step further and consider his thoughts on the identity of the Divine.

Based on what I see in the Gathas:

~ 'existence' is one 'being' (temporarily fragmented into material shells to effectuate the perfecting process);³⁸

~ all the perfected fragments (which have attained lordship over the qualities that make a being divine) are no longer fragmented. They comprise a unity that is Divine (which is consistent with Zarathushtra's use of the sg. and the pl. in his references to the Divine).³⁹

So the Divine in Zarathushtra's thought is not a separate Entity ~ separate from the rest of existence. The Divine is the perfected part of a whole ~ existence. The Divine is the part that has acquired 'lordship' over the qualities that make a being divine. And it is acquisition of this 'lordship' that generates the **foremost envisionments** (in lines c. and d.) ~ a 'lordship' that eventually will be acquired by every fragment of existence as part of the perfecting process.

So the preceding **foremost envisionments** are not 'truths' that have been made, given to us, and established by an authority figure ~ a Lord ~ who is separate from the rest of us. These **foremost envisionments** are truths that are understood through a quality of being which every part of existence has incompletely now, and which every part of existence will eventually attain completely ~ acquiring 'lordship' over these qualities that make a being divine.⁴⁰

So in line e., (doubtless with a sense of irony) by choosing 'Lord' instead of 'Wisdom' as the name of the Divine, Zarathushtra has chosen to place emphasis on the imperfect ~ on the process of acquiring 'lordship', acquiring an understanding of the **foremost envisionments** that each of us ~ every fragment of existence ~ incrementally will eventually attain. This certainty of the 'good end' in the Gathas, in later Avestan texts, and in Pahlavi texts, is a principle of Zarathushtra's system of thought which survived all the burning of texts and killing of the learned, but which most translators of the Gathas (and some YAv. passages) have consistently overlooked, because (with respect) they have approached their translations with the mind-set of other religious paradigms that did not exist in Zarathushtra's day (nor even in Younger Avestan times).

* * *

Here is the entire verse ~ in my translation and the translations of the linguist in our group, so that you can see and compare their opinions and interpretations regarding the meanings of the words and how they are put together (syntax).

My translation.

- c. 'That indeed (is) false which to falsehood (is) most-good';
- d. 'that (is) truthful to which (being) truthful (for its own sake is) dear;'
- e. 'which (are) the foremost envisionments You have given, Lord.' Y46.6c.d.e.

Inslar 1975

- c. "For that person is deceitful who is extremely good to the deceitful man,
- d. and that person is truthful for whom the truthful man is a friend,
- e. ever since Thou didst establish the first conceptions, Lord." Y46.6c.d.e.

Humbach 1991

- c. "For that one (counts as) deceitful who (is) best to the deceitful one,
- d. that one (counts as) truthful to whom a truthful one (is) a friend,
- e. since Thou didst establish religious views (to be) primal, O Ahura." Y46.6c.d.e.

Humbach/Faiss 2010

- c. "That one indeed (counts as) deceitful who is very good /dear to the deceitful one,
- d. that one (counts as) truthful to whom the truthful one is a friend,

e. as you established the views / religions (to be) fundamental, O Lord." Y46.6c.d.e.

Taraporewala 1951

c. "because he-himself (is) wicked who (is) best-intentioned to-the-follower-of-Untruth,

d. (and) he-indeed (is) righteous to whom the Truthful-One (is) dear;

e. ever since Thou-didst-create (our) original Inner-Selves, O Ahura." Y46.6c.d.e.

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae.

c. "For he is himself a Liar, who is very good to a Liar,

d. he is a righteous man to whom a righteous man is dear,

e. since thou has createdst men's Selves in the beginning, O Ahura." Y46.6c.d.e.

* * * * *

¹ Our verse (Y46.6 line a.) starts with the word *at* ~ one of those flexible Avestan particles which has various meanings ~ 'but, so, thus, then, moreover, furthermore, and'. Skjaervo 2006 explains that *at* connects a statement with what precedes it and is sometimes used in contrast. So this connective is used sometimes as a contrast ("but"), sometimes as an explanation ("so, thus"), and sometimes as a supplement ('then, moreover, furthermore, therefore, and'). So in understanding line a. of our verse (Y46.6), we would need to understand the immediately preceding verse (Y46.5), in order to know whether our verse provides a contrast, an explanation, or a supplement to it. But both lines a. and b. of our verse, and also the immediately preceding verse have yet to be accurately deciphered ~ demonstrated by translation differences and the fact that existing translations (with respect) make little sense and have no connection with the verses that precede it.

And the rest of lines a. and b. in our verse Y46.6 also have translation differences, indicating that their decoding is still speculative. For these reasons, we need to set on the back burner, lines a. and b. of our verse together with the immediately preceding verse (Y45.5), until the de-coding of GAv. has advanced sufficiently to give us some understanding of their meanings. We therefore cannot use the context of these passages to help us ascertain the meaning of lines c., d., and e. in our verse Y46.6.

To illustrate these translation differences, here are Y46.5 and Y46.6 in GAv. (Geldner) and as translated by each linguist in our group. I have not shown a given translator's preferred emendations of (changes to) GAv. words.

Y46.5

a. *yā. vā. xšayqs. adqs. drūtā. ayaṇtəm.*

b. *urvātōiš. vā. huzəntuš. miθroībyō. vā.*

c. *rašnā. jvqs. yā. ašavā. drəgvaṇtəm.*

d. *vīcirō. hqs. taṭ. frō. x'aētavē. mruyāṭ.*

e. *uzūiθyōi. īm. mazdā. xrūnyāṭ. ahurā.♦♦*

Y46.6

a. *aṭ. yastəm. nōiṭ. nā. isəmnō. āyāṭ.*

b. *drūjō. hvō. dāmqn. haiθyā. gāṭ.*

c. *hvō. zī. drəgvā. yā. drəgvāitē. vahištō.*

d. *hvō. ašavā. yahmāi. ašavā. fryō.*

e. *hyaṭ daēnā paouruyā dā ahurā* Y46.6 Geldner 1P pp. 160 - 161.

Insler 1975, pp. 81, 83.

Y46.5 a. ~ e. "The man of good lineage, who is master of a house, should respectfully receive any person coming (to him), be it in consequence of an order or (other) pacts. (But) if a truthful person, living in

accordance with this directive, discerns that man to be deceitful he should declare it to his own family in order to save it from violation, Wise Lord."

Y46.6 a. ~ e. "But which person, likewise being able [ft. 6 "Namely, also being a man of means."] would not (receive) him who shall come, such a person shall go to the bonds of deceit's captivity. For that person is deceitful who is extremely good to the deceitful man, and that person is truthful for whom the truthful man is a friend, ever since Thou didst establish the first conceptions, Lord."

Humbach 1991, Vol. 1, p. 169.

Y46.5

a. - b. "If a (truthful) landowner were to take in a (deceitful person) who approaches (him), by providing (him with) accommodation, (being) well-acquainted (with him) in by stipulation, or contracts, ~
c. ~ d. (if such) a truthful one, living in rectitude (and) having judicial authority, (were to take in such) a deceitful (person), he should tell the fact to (his own) family,
e. to protect that (deceitful person) against bloodshed, O Wise Ahura."

Y46.6

a. "But were such a (deceitful person) not to approach that (landowner) (as) a man seeking (help),
b. in (his) search for partnership let him go to the abodes of deceit." Y46.6.
c. "For that one (counts as) deceitful who (is) best to the deceitful one,
d. that one (counts as) truthful to whom a truthful one (is) a friend,
e. since Thou didst establish religious views (to be) primal, O Ahura."

Humbach/Faiss 2010, p. 134.

Y46.5

a. "A master who would put up at his home one approaching (him to seek refuge),
b. ~ (the newcomer is) a nobleman (changing over) from (his) confession and bonds ~
c. a truthful one living lawfully (thus putting up) a deceitful person,
d. being competent he may tell that (his) family
e. in order to save the (newcomer) from bloodshed, O Wise Lord."

Y46.6

a. "Yet that man who should not approach him to seek (refuge),
b. in his search for partnership he shall betake himself to the places of deceit.
c. That one indeed (counts as) deceitful who is very good /dear to the deceitful one,
d. that one (counts as) truthful to whom the truthful one is a friend,
e. as you established the views / religions (to be) fundamental, O Lord."

Taraporewala 1951, pp. 586, 591.

Y46.5

a. "Whoso, however, being-in-power receives with-consideration a suppliant
b. whether (as) by-Divine-Ordinance or out-of-humanity, (this) wise-one,
c. this follower-of-truth, living in-rectitude, (thus receives even) a-follower-of-Untruth;
d. with-discrimination should-he-reveal (to him) that (Knowledge which leads) to self-reliance,
e. to-save him, O Mazda Ahura, from utter-destruction."

Y46.6

a. "But the man of-power who comes not to-him (with help),
b. shall himself come-among the ensnaring enticers of Untruth;
c. because he-himself (is) wicked who (is) best-intentioned to-the-follower-of-Untruth,
d. (and) he-indeed (is) righteous to whom the Truthful-One (is) dear;
e. ever since Thou-didst-create (our) original Inner-Selves, O Ahura."

Moulton 1912, p. 373.

Y46.5

a ~ e.. "If an understanding man should be able to hold one who comes over from his vow and his ties of faith, himself having brought him thereto, and living according to the ordinance, a righteous man (converting) a Liar ~ then shall he tell it to the nobles, that they may protect him from injury, O Mazda Ahura.

Y46.6

a. ~ e. "But whoso when thus approached should refuse his aid, he shall go to the abodes of the company of the Lie. For he is himself a Liar, who is very good to a Liar, he is a righteous man to whom a righteous man is dear, since thou has createdst men's Selves in the beginning, O Ahura."

Bartholomae. (Tarap. 1951 pp. 590, 593).

Y46.5

a ~ e.. "If an understanding man should be able to hold one who comes over from his vow and his ties of faith, himself having brought him thereto, and living according to the ordinance, a righteous man (converting) a Liar ~ then shall he, when he is sure of him, tell it to the nobles, that they may protect him from injury O Mazda Ahura."

Y46.6

a. ~ e. "But whoso when thus approached should refuse his aid, he shall go to the abodes of the company of the Liar. For he is himself a Liar, who is very good to a Liar, he is a righteous man to whom a righteous man is dear, since thou hast created men's Selves in the beginning, O Ahura."

² Insler 1975, pp. 82 (and ft. 7) ~ 83; commentary at pp. 267 ~ 269.

Humbach 1991, Vol. 1 p. 169; commentary at Vol. 2 pp. 180 ~ 181.

Humbach/Faiss 2010 p. 134; commentary at p. 186.

Taraporewala 1951, pp. 591; commentary at pp. 592 ~ 593.

Moulton 1912 p. 373, and ft. 7.

Bartholomae (as shown in Taraporewala 1951 p. 593).

³ Line c. *hvō zī drəgvā yā drəgvāitē vahištō*

'That [*hvō*] indeed [*zī*] (is) false [*drəgvā*], which [*yā*] to falsehood [*drəgvāitē*] (is) most-good [*vahištō*].' My translation. Here are the linguistic details.

hvō 'that', is a demonstrative pronoun. The origins of this word seem to puzzle both Beekes 1988 and Skjaervo 2006 who do not show it in their regular table of demonstrative pronouns, but conjecture that its stem is *ha-*.

Beekes states that for this (conjectured) stem, the expected form of nom. sg. is not found but that it is replaced by *hvō* p. 139.

Skjaervo 2006 likewise does not show the nom. sg. masc. form of *ha-* in his Table, but appends a "Note" in which he states "For the nom. sg. masc. *hvō* 'that one' appears to be used." *Old Avestan*, Lesson 2, p. 15).

Skjaervo 2006 in his *Old Avestan Glossary* says the stem *ha-* means "that one, yon[der]"; the word 'yonder' (a somewhat old fashioned word) can mean 'that' (e.g. *yonder tree*) and also 'over there' (e.g. *yonder lies the meadow*).

Jackson 1892 shows *ha-* as one of a number of demonstrative pronoun stems which he says means 'this'. He shows the YAv. nom. masc./ntr. form *hō* (but does not show the GAv. nom. masc./ntr. *hvō*).

There is no dispute that a demonstrative pronoun can be used as a noun 'that (one)', 'that (person)' or 'this (one)', 'this (person)'. And demonstrative pronouns can also be used as 3p pronouns in GAv. (he/she/it), Skjaervo 2006, *Old Avestan*, Lesson 2, p. 15; Beekes 1988 p. 137, Jackson 1892 § 409 (a), p. 117.

I have opted to take *hvō* as a demonstrative pronoun nom. sg. masc./ntr. 'that' referring to a concept ~ what is false *drəgvā*.

zī 'indeed'. Beekes 1988 shows *zī* as a particle which can mean 'for' or (as a particle of emphasis) 'indeed', (p. 146); Skjaervo 2006 shows *zī* as a conjunction, meaning 'for'.

drəgvā 'false' is nom. sg. of the adjective stem *drəgvant-* (Beekes 1988 pp. 118 - 119, although he spells the stem *drugvant-* and its nom. sg. form *drugvāh* because he surmises those were the forms of these words at when the Gathas were composed). I take *drəgvā* as an adj. as do all of the linguists in our group, except for Moulton and Bartholomae ~ each such translation is shown here.

My translation 'That [*hvō*] indeed [*zī*] (is) false [*drəgvā* adj.],'

Insler 1975, "For [*zī*] that person [*hvō*] is deceitful [*drəgvā* adj.]"

Humbach 1991, "For that one (counts as) deceitful [*drəgvā* adj.],"

Humbach/Faiss 2010, "That one indeed (counts as) deceitful [*drəgvā* adj.]"

Taraporewala 1951, "because he-himself (is) wicked [*drəgvā* adj.]"

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "For he is himself a liar [*drəgvā* noun/person]"

yā 'which'; according to Skjaervo's 2006 *Glossary of Old Avestan words*, *yā* is a declension of the relative pronoun stem *ya-* (in GAv.) but he does not identify its declension. Jackson 1892 shows that it is one of the forms for nom. sg. in GAv. (the YAv. form being a bit different).

drəgvāitē 'to falsehood'; Skjaervo 2006 shows that *drəgvāitē* is dat. sg. of the stem *drəgvant-*. The dat. case can be translated as either 'to ___' or 'for ___'. The context require that we translate this adj. as a noun, and I have opted to translated it as a noun that is a concept. Our other translators have opted to translate it as a noun that is a person. And all except Moulton and Bartholomae have opted to add the definite article 'the' instead of the indefinite article 'a' (in Av. there are no articles) ~ 'to the deceitful man', 'to the deceitful one', 'to the follower of Untruth', 'to a Liar'. But if translated as a concept, no article is required, and I have not added one.

vahištō 'most-good' is nom. sg. masc. of the adj. stem *vahišta-*, (Skjaervo 2006). This is a generic or grammatical masc. ('most-good' has no intrinsic gender).

⁴ See *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Most-Good, Vahishta; A Question Of Reward & The Path; and The Houses of Paradise & Hell*.

⁵ See *Part Three: Heaven in Other Avestan Texts*.

⁶ Detailed in *Part Three: Heaven In Other Avestan Texts; and Heaven & Hell In Pazand & Pahlavi Texts*.

⁷ The notion of 'paradise' as a state of being is detailed in *Part Two: The Houses of Paradise & Hell* (for the Gathas); and in *Part Three: Heaven in Other Avestan Texts*, (for later Av. texts).

⁸ The meaning of *drəgvant-* is discussed in detail in *Part Three: Ashavan & Dregvant*.

⁹ See in *Part Three: The Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu), An Analysis, and The Ahuna Vairya (Yatha Ahu Vairyo), An Analysis*, for a discussion of the factors that govern when a verb or other word is implied in GAv.

¹⁰ In English, whether a word is nom. (the subject of a verb) or acc. (the object of a verb) does not depend on the form of the word, but rather on the order in which the word appears in the sentence. For example in the sentences

a man (subject nom.) *assaulted a neighbor* (object acc.);

a neighbor (subject nom.) *assaulted a man* (object acc.);

The form of the words *man* and *neighbor* do not change. It is their position in the sentence that determines which word is the subject (nom.) and which is the object (acc.).

In a language of inflection, like Avestan (and Vedic, and Latin), the order in which a word appears in a sentence or phrase does not determine its grammatical value (subject or object). It is the inflected form of the word that determines its grammatical value ~ in this case subject (nom.) or object (acc.). Take for example,

word *nar-* 'man'. Skjaervo 2006 shows that in its pl. form, when it is the subject its form is *narō* (nom. pl. 'men'); when it is the object its form is *nərqš* (acc. pl. 'men').

Which brings us to why in a language of inflection (like Avestan) the verb 'to be' should have an object, in nom. form. This is easy to understand if we think of this verb 'to be' as an equals sign. The object is the same as, or describes (i.e. is equal to), the subject (nom.) ~ requiring that the object also be in nom. For example, *That scent is (=) a floral fragrance.* There is an equivalence between *scent* (subject nom.) and *floral fragrance* which (under the rules of grammar governing languages of inflection) requires that the form of the object be nom. (instead of the usual acc.).

In addition to the verb 'to be', a few other verbs that function in a similar way, (e.g. 'to seem') also take an object in nom. form (called a predicate noun or adj.) Skjaervo 2003, *Young Avestan*, Lesson 3, p. 19, § 2. But here, I think the implied verb 'to be' fits the context best ~ as do all of the translators in our group who also add an implied 'is' in their translations (although not always in round parentheses).

¹¹ Beekes 1988, p. 137, 139; Jackson 1892, § 409 (a), p. 117; Skjaervo 2006 *Old Avestan*, Lesson 2, p. 15.

¹² See *Part Three: Ashavan & Dregvant*, for a more detailed discussion of these adjectives that can be used as a noun ~ a person, concept or other thing ~ that has the qualities of the adj.

¹³ See *Part Six: Yasna 30.3 and 4*; and *Part Three: Ashavan & Dregvant*.

¹⁴ In Y33.3 *vahištō* is used to indicate being supportive ~ but supportive in a way that is intrinsically good. "The person who is very good to a truthful man [*yā ašāunē vahištō* '(the one) who (is) very good to a truth-possessing person'], be he allied by family, or a member of his community, or allied by clan, Lord, or be he someone who continues to serve the cow with zeal, such a person shall be on the pasture of truth and good thinking." Y33.3, Insler 1975. But in no verse is a *vahišta-* word used for being supportive of what is intrinsically bad, harmful, untruthful. Parenthetically, the 'cow' here is an allegory for the beneficial in mortal existence (discussed in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Cow & Its Network*).

¹⁵ The evidence that *aša-* and *druj-* are opposites is detailed in a ft. in *Part Two: The Houses of Paradise & Hell*. The evidence that their respective adjectives *ašavan-* and *drəvənt-* are opposites, is shown in *Part Three: Ashavan & Dregvant*.

¹⁶ The fact that goodness (*vohu /vahišta*) is equated with the true (correct) order of existence (*aša-*) is detailed in *Part One: Truth, Asha*; and in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Most Good, Vahishta*.

¹⁷ Discussed in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Most Good, Vahishta*.

¹⁸ Detailed in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Most-Good, Vahishta*.

¹⁹ See for example, *Part One: The Nature of the Divine*, which discusses the nature of the deities of Zarathushtra's culture and the ways to worship them, as well as Zarathushtra's re-thinking of the nature of the Divine ~ how he perceived it to be, and his re-thinking of how the Divine should be worshipped (discussed in more detail in *Part Two: The Puzzle of Worship*).

²⁰ Detailed in *Part Two: A Question of Reward & The Path*; and *The Puzzle of Worship*.

²¹ Discussed in *Part One: The Paradox of the Material & The Spiritual*.

²² One such verse is Y53.4, a part of which has been translated as follows, referring to Zarathushtra's daughter, Pouruchisti, "...if she is truthful [*ašāuni*] to the truthful [*ašavabyō* dat. pl.], the Wise Lord shall grant (to her) the sunlike gain of good thinking ... for her whole lifetime..." Y53.4, Insler 1975. But (with respect) this is not consistent with Zarathushtra's thought. To say that one should be truthful to truthful people implies that we need not be truthful to anyone else, which is contrary to Zarathushtra's teaching that we should be truthful for truth's own sake. Moreover in no place do the Gathas say that good thinking (the comprehension of

truth) is achieved by being truthful to truthful persons. But this problem disappears if we translate the adjective *aṣavabyō* [dat. pl. of the adj. stem *aṣavan-*] as a noun that is concept. Thus literally, '(if she is) truthful [*aṣāuni*] to (all that is) truthful [*aṣavabyō*], Wisdom the Lord will give (her) the sunlike gain of good thinking ...' Y53.4, my translation. The linguistics of this phrase are discussed in a ft. in *Part Three: Ashavan & Dregvant*.

²³ Line d. *hvō aṣavā / yahmāi aṣavā fryō*.

'That (is) truthful to which (being) truthful (for its own sake is) dear.' my translation.

hvō 'that'; here, as in line c. I have opted to take *hvō* as a demonstrative pronoun. Jackson 1892 shows it as nom. sg. masc./ntr. which matches the declension of *aṣavā* to which it refers.

aṣavā 'truthful'; nom. sg. of the masc./ntr. stem *aṣavan-* 'truthful' (Skjaervo 2006). Beekes shows the stem as an adj. 'truthful' (p. 120 although he spells it *artavan-* because he surmises that was its form when, or before, the Gathas were composed). This adj. can be used as a noun. I take both the first and second *aṣavā* words as adjectives.

yahmāi 'to/for which' dat. sg. masc./ntr. of the relative pronoun stem *ya-*. The dat. can be expressed in English as either 'to which' or 'for which'. Based on the context I take it as 'to which'.

fryō 'dear'; nom. sg. of the adj. stem *frya-*. Reichelt 1911 says this adj. means "dear, kind, friend". Skjaervo 2006 shows *frya-* as an adj. meaning "friendly, friend". I have opted to give *fryō* its original grammatical value ~ an adj. ~ 'dear' (as in loved, 'beloved').

²⁴ Detailed in *Part Two: A Question of Reward & The Path*.

²⁵ For a general translation and discussion, see *Part One: The Manthra of Truth Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu)*; for a more detailed translation and discussion see *Part Three: The Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu), An Analysis*.

²⁶ Detailed in *Part One: The Nature of the Divine*.

²⁷ Detailed in *Part One: Love*.

²⁸ The different translations of *frya-* words in the Gathas, are detailed in *Part One: The Nature of the Divine* which include translations by Bode & Nanavutty. Here, I have limited the translations to the linguists in our group. In addition to the verses discussed in that chapter, the word *fryā* appear in Y44.1, in connection with the instr. *aṣā* and has been translated by most of our linguists as an adjective, as follows,

Insler 1975, "... and how friendly [*fryā*] associations with truth are to be established by us, in order that it shall come to us together with good thinking." Y44.1, p. 67.

Humbach 1991, "... Let friendly [*fryā*] fellowships be granted us by truth so that one may come to us with good thought." Y44.1, Vol. 1, p. 156.

Humbach/Faiss 2010, "... We want, indeed, to learn from our friend [*fryā* ?] (and) partner how He/one will come to us with good thought." Y44.1, p. 120 (the instr. *aṣā* is missing from their translation);

Taraporewala 1951, "...and through loving [*fryā*] Asha may assistance be-extended to us, until Vohu Mano shall-arrive amongst-us." Y44.1, p. 459.

Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae "... and through friendly [*fryā*] Right [*aṣā*] give us support, that Good Thought may come unto us." Y44.1, Moulton p. 367; for Barth. Tarap. 1951, p. 461.

²⁹ Detailed in *Part Six: Yasna 54.1, A Airyema Ishyo*.

³⁰ The Gatha verse Y46.10 says, "Wise Lord, whoever ~ be it man or woman ~ would grant to me those things which Thou dost know to be the best [*vahištā* 'most good'] for existence, namely, the truth for the truth [*ašəm ašāi*] and the rule of good thinking, (with that person) as well as those whom I shall accompany in the glory of your kind ~ with all these I shall cross over the Bridge of the Judge." Y46.10, Insler 1975. (See *Part Three: Chinvat, The Bridge of Discerning*). Here in Y46.10 "truth for the truth" means "truth for (the sake of) truth (itself)".

The *Asha Vahishta* (*Ashem Vohu*) manthra (Y27.14) ends with the line:

hyaṭ ašāi vahištāi ašəm "which (is) the true order of existence, for (the sake of) the true order of existence, the most-good (existence)." My translation; or, using the short hand truth for *ašəm/ ašāi* 'which is truth for (the sake of) truth, the most-good'. For a detailed discussion and other translations, see *Part One: The Manthra of Truth Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu)*; and *Part Three: The Asha Vahishta (Ashem Vohu), An Analysis*.

Our line (Y46.6d) expresses the same concept as the above two instances, but with the added dimension of loving being truthful, 'that (is) truthful to which (being) truthful (for its own sake is) dear (as in 'loved').' my translation.

³¹ Line e. *hyaṭ daēnā paouruyā dā ahurā*

which (are) the foremost envisionments you have given, Lord.

Here is the grammatical value and meaning of each word in line e., with comments on translation choices made by the translators in our group, and my own choices.

hyaṭ is a GAv. word that offers many translation options (as you can see from the ways in which it has been translated by our group). Bear with me while I give you some linguistic information which will help you to understand the various (linguistically accurate) translation options ~ to illustrate the fact that the option a translator selects is of necessity an interpretative choice.

hyaṭ (in GAv.) is a relative pronoun, (a form of the relative pronoun stem *ya-* 'that, which, who'). Its form is nom./acc. *ntr. sg.* (Skjaervo 2006 *Old Avestan*, Lesson 3, p. 26; Jackson 1892 § 403, p. 115). Parenthetically, in this context (in literal translation) *hyaṭ* cannot be a relative pronoun describing *daēnā* 'envisionments' (as in 'which envisionments (are) the foremost you have given O Lord') because *daēnā* 'envisionments' is fem. pl. whereas *hyaṭ* is *ntr. sg.* (according to Jackson) ~ although as a practical matter, it makes no difference to the meaning of line e. Returning to the translation options of *hyaṭ*:

A relative pronoun normally introduces a subordinate clause. Here are some examples, with the relative pronoun in red font (1) *It is a language that is difficult to master*; (2) *This is a book which is very entertaining*; (3) *These are people who are devoted to truth*. As you can see, in each instance, the subordinate clause introduced by the relative pronoun (*that, which, who*) describes the noun in the main clause.

And indeed Skjaervo 2006 states that in GAv. clauses introduced by relative pronouns are generally "adjectival"; but he notes that in some instances, ~ just like with other Av. adjectives ~ the relative pronoun introducing a subordinate clause can stand for a noun. He calls it being "substantivized" (*Old Avestan*, Lesson 12, p. 133).

In Lesson 11 (of *Old Avestan*) describing subordinate clauses he says that most substantival and adverbial clauses are introduced by *hyaṭ* which he classifies in the following ways ~ each generating a different meaning in English.

~ "Substantival *hyaṭ* clauses" in which *hyaṭ* functions as a noun and is translated (by Skjaervo) as 'that' (p. 122).

~ "Temporal *hyaṭ* clauses" [in which *hyaṭ* functions adverbially] and is translated 'when, whenever' (pp. 123 - 124) ~ indicating time;

~ "Causal *hyaṭ* clauses" in which *hyaṭ* is translated 'because, thereby' (pp. 124 - 125);

~ "*hyaṭ* clauses of consequence" in which *hyaṭ* is translated 'so that' (p. 125) ~ where the subordinate clause is a consequence; and

"Conditional *hyaṭ* clauses" in which *hyaṭ* is translated 'if' (p. 125).

In line e. Insler 1975, and Taraporewala 1951 translate *hyaṭ* as "ever since" and Moulton 1912 and Bartholomae as "since" ~ each as a "temporal *hyaṭ* clause" (using Skjaervo's terminology) indicating time; thus used adverbially.

Humbach 1991, translates *hyaṭ* as "since" but in a context that is (perhaps) a "causal *hyaṭ* clause" (used in the sense of 'because');

Humbach/Faiss 2010 translate *hyaṭ* as "as"; it is not clear to me whether they intended it to function as "temporal" or as "causal".

With respect, I do not agree that *hyaṭ* in line e. introduces either a "temporal" or "causal" subordinate clause, because (in Zarathushtra's thought) the two preceding ideas are truths in their own right ~ envisionments given by the Lord. They are not truths 'ever since' or 'because' they have been given (or established) by the Lord.

I think that line e. is a "substantival *hyaṭ* clause" (functioning as a subordinate clause to lines c. and d.) in which *hyaṭ* stands for a noun ~ the preceding truths in lines c. and d. In such clauses, Skjaervo translates *hyaṭ* as "that". But in English, a relative pronoun standing for a noun that is not a person, can be translated as 'that' or 'which'. I therefore translate *hyaṭ* in line e. as "which".

One might question: if *hyaṭ* represents a noun ~ standing for the ideas in the two preceding lines ~ why is it sg.? Why isn't it du. or even pl. in that the first precept (using *vahištō*) contains a multiplicity of ideas)? Well, Skjaervo 2006 informs us that when a relative pronoun refers to more than one antecedent, it "agrees with the closest one" (Lesson 12, p. 133). In our verse, the noun in the immediately preceding line d. is *aṣavā-* (sg.) (used first as an adjective 'truthful' and the 2d time as a noun (concept) 'truthfulness') ~ ntr. because the underlying noun ~ a concept, *aṣa-* is ntr. which "agrees" with the ntr. sg. *hyaṭ*. In English we do not have such an idiomatic rule which would make a literal translation awkward, but we do not need to be concerned because in English, "which" is the form for both the sg. and pl. relative pronoun, so it does not sound awkward.

daēnā 'envisionments' is nom./voc./acc. pl. of the (grammatically) fem. stem noun *daēnā-* (see *Part Three: Daena* for a detailed discussion of its linguistics and meaning). In line e. the nom. pl. fits.

paouruyā 'first' is nom./acc. pl. fem., and as such belongs with *daēnā* 'envisionments'. It is used here in the sense of first in quality and importance ~ hence 'foremost'. In Avestan (as in English) 'first' can be used in various ways (detailed in *Part Three: Paourvya*). One of these ways is 'first' in quality and importance. For example,

First in quality and importance, used for an idea (foremost), ("...instruct me (in these very things) ... by means of which the foremost [*paouruyō*] existence shall come about here." Y28.1, Insler 1975);

First in quality and importance ~ used for a person ("Yes, although Thou art the First One [*paourvīm*]..." Y31.8, Insler 1975);

ahurā 'O Lord' voc. sg. of the masc. noun stem *ahura-*.

dā 'you have given'; Skjaervo 2006 shows that *dā* is aorist injunctive 2p sg. of the verb stem *dā-*, which has multiple (somewhat related) meanings 'to give, to make, to create, to establish, to assign etc.

Skjaervo 2003 shows how the aorist injunctive would translate into English. Using the verb 'to do' as an example, he gives the 3p aor. inj. as "he did, he has done".

Returning to *dā-* from amongst its many meanings, I have opted for 'you have given' (2p sg. aor. inj.), because in the Gathas, creation, making, is by 'birthing' ~ by emanation ~ by generating, *giving* the thing from the source (see *Part Two: The Puzzle of Creation*). So there would have to be a unity of identity between the generator, and what is generated. In Zarathushtra's thought, the Divine (in line e. *ahurā*) is a life force that has acquired 'lordship' over, and is, the true (correct) order of existence ('truth' for short). So to generate (give from itself) truth for truth's own sake would be to give a precept that is of Its very essence ~ the 'foremost',

highest, premier, thing that It could give (together with an expression of the opposite envisionment, to ensure clarity ~ and expressed with a touch of mischief ~ using the puzzle of *vahištō*).

Thus, ' ~ which [*hyaŋ*], (are) the foremost [*paourvya*] envisionments [*daēnā*] You have given [*dā*], Lord [*ahurā*].'
My translation.

³² See *Part Three: Daena*.

³³ Detailed in *Part Three: Paourvya*.

³⁴ In the Pahlavi *Selections of Zad-sparam*, we see this idea (but expressed a bit differently). It states that the first requirement for the renovation of the universe is a recognition that the Divine is all good. And of course, the whole notion of the renovation is evolving to an existence that is all good ~ no longer a mix of more good and bad (Y30.3), more beneficial and harmful (Y45.2). This idea is discussed (and the Pahlavi quotation from *Zad-sparam* is given and referenced) in *Part Two Asha & the Checkmate Solution*.

³⁵ Detailed in *Part Three: Evolution of the Name(s) Ahura, Mazda*.

³⁶ Zarathushtra's profound views regarding the identity of the divine, are detailed in *Part One: The Identity of the Divine*; and *Completeness & Non-Deathness, Haurvatat, Ameretat*. And the ways in which he uses 'Lord' in the Gathas are detailed in *Part One: The Nature of the Divine*, and in *Part Two: The Lords & The Equations of Y34.1*.

³⁷ Detailed in *Part One: The Nature of the Divine*.

³⁸ Detailed in *Part Two: A Question of Immanence; The Puzzle of Creation; and Did Wisdom Choose Too?*

³⁹ Detailed in *Part Two: The Puzzle of the Singular & The Plural*.

⁴⁰ Detailed in *Part Two: Asha & The Checkmate Solution; The Puzzle of Creation; In Part One: Completeness, Non-Deathness, Haurvatat, Ameretat*, and other chapters throughout this work.